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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.  Background to research 
 
Swaziland recently established a framework for enforcing competition law when 
it passed the Competition, Act 8 of 2007 (Swazi Competition Act).1 The Act 
provides for the establishment of the Swaziland Competition Commission (Swazi 
Commission), a statutory body responsible for the administration and enforcement of 
the Competition Act.2 One of its major objectives is to promote a secure and robust 
economic competition and consumer protection.3  Following its inception in 2007, 
the Swazi Commission has dealt with mergers and the question on the legality and 
enforcement of exclusionary clauses in contracts. These clauses are most prevalent in 
contracts for lease on property seeking to establish large shopping malls, as we shall 
see later from the case of Pick`n Pay (Pty) Ltd v The Gables (Pty) Ltd.4 
The adoption of a comprehensive competition law framework by Swaziland is 
relatively a new phenomenon and like other developing countries, the Swaziland 
competition regime presents some institutional challenges. Some of these challenges 
relate to the institutional structure of the Commission and its independence. Whether 
the independence of the Commission can be guaranteed in view of the manner it is 
constructed as well as the relationship between the Swazi Commission and the courts 
and finally, the jurisdictional powers of the Commission in the execution of its duties 
and functions in terms of the Act. These challenges taken together have a potential of 
undermining the independence and effectiveness of the only institution that has the 
mandate to create and ensure free and transparent markets in the country. 
This treatise seeks to analyse these challenges as presented by the Swaziland 
competition regime. A comparative analysis between Swaziland and the South 
African competition regime will be carried out in order to provide somewhat 
                                                          
1 Swaziland Competition Act 8 of 2007, An Act to provide for the encouragement of Competition in 
the economy by controlling anti-competitive trade practices, mergers and acquisitions, protecting 
consumer welfare and providing for an institutional mechanism for implementing the objectives of the 
Act and other matters incidental thereto. Available at www.swazilii.org/sz/legislation/act/2007/8, 
accessed on 10 July 2014. 
2
 Section  6 of the Swazi Competition Act. 
3
 The official newsletter for the Swaziland Competition Commission, April 2014, available at 
http://www.compco.co.sz/images/newsletter.pdf  accessed on 15 August 2014. 
4
 Pick`n Pay retailers (Pty) Limited v The Gables (Pty) Limited  case No: (1639/2012) [SZHC]. 
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practical solutions to the challenges that Swaziland is confronted with. It is also 
aimed at setting out proposal for the reform of the competition framework of 
Swaziland to incorporate the bifurcated agency model as opposed to the integrated 
agency model it is currently structured on. Under the bifurcated agency model the 
Commission investigates all competition violations and then hand over the cases to a 
specialised tribunal for adjudication and enforcement.5 In the contrary the integrated 
agency model entails that the Commission investigates and make the first -level 
adjudication.6 The decision of the Commission can then be reviewed or appealed by 
the courts. This is the model adopted by Swaziland according to the Act.7 
1.1 The need for the reform 
  
It is recognised that competition law and policy has a crucial role to play in 
developing countries, both in promoting a competitive environment and in building 
and sustaining public support for a pro-competitive policy stance by the 
government.8 Competition law should create and maintain a free and competitive 
business environment in both the national product and geographic market, and leads 
to the enhancement of economic efficiency at the firm level and the economic 
welfare of consumers. In the South African context it has been observed that the fight 
against exploitative firms largely feeds to the fight against poverty and inequality.9 
This view is in line with the objective of competition policy in many jurisdictions 
including Swaziland, which is the protection of consumer welfare.10 There is also 
consensus in the United States jurisprudence on this position as Fingleton and 
Nikpay points out that; 
‘It may seem somewhat unusual to a US audience that the underlying rationale of 
competition policy is still being debated in other jurisdictions…in the US the principal 
antitrust ideologies have, by in large, converged on the idea that the protection of 
                                                          
5
 EM Fox and MJ Trebilcock The Design of Competition Law Institutions: Global Norms, Local Choices 
1
st




 See in this respect Sections 13, 14 (6) and 40 of the Swazi Competition Act. 
8
 J Hurungo and M Tekere ‘Multilateral Framework for Competition Policy; Where do Consumers 
Stand?’ 10 April 2002, available at http://www.Consumersinternational.org/news-and-
media/resources-zone/multilateral-framework-for-competition-policy-where-do-african-consumers-
stand/, accessed on 29 August 2014. 
9
 Fox and Trebilcock op cit (n 5) 266. 
10
 See in this respect section 2 (b) and (c) of the Competition Act of South Africa, 
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consumer welfare is antitrust ultimate purpose’.11 
 
Competition brings about efficiency through enhanced inter-firm rivalry, 
limiting anti-competitive behaviour in the market as well as prohibiting government-
led market distortions.12 The goal of competition policy should always be to benefit 
society as a whole by ensuring that economies work efficiently in permitting 
consumers to decide and communicate what products and services they want, and 
sellers to respond to their demands as competitively and inexpensively as possible 
being aided in whole by the legislations and institutions formed specifically for that 
purpose.13 Competition policy in the global world seeks to offset monopoly power 
and inefficient government regulation.14 Therefore, the regulatory body should 
appreciate the role that it can play in the promotion of a balanced competition policy 
which is favourable to both competitors and consumers.15 
 
In view of this background, the prime purpose of this dissertation is to 
explore and analyse the Swaziland Competition framework in order to foster a way 
in which it can be improved to fully achieve these overarching objectives. To achieve 
this, the paper analyses three broad issues which relates to the independence of the 
Swazi Commission, the scope of its jurisdiction and the implementation of its 
decisions. It also investigates the role of the courts in the enforcement of competition 
law in the country. Finally, the paper explores areas which requires action and 
propose strategies that should be adopted and make the necessary proposals for 




                                                          
11
 J Fingleton and A Nikpay ‘Stimulating or Chilling Competition: International Antitrust Law and 
Policy’ March 2009, available at http://www.jurispub.com/cart.php?m=product_details&p=9157, 
accessed on 18 August 2014. 
12
 Hurungo and Tekere op cit (n 8). 
13
 Ibid. 
14 DFID Competition Assessment Framework: ‘An Operational guide for identifying barriers to 
competition in Developing Countries’, January 2008, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/reducingregulatoryrestrictionsoncompetition/46192459.pdf, 
accessed on 16 August 2014. 
15
 Ibid.  
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1.2 Objectives of the paper 
 
The paramount objective of this paper has already been placed on limelight 
above, however, it is necessary on this introductory chapter to highlight and 
demonstrate in details the three challenges which this paper seeks to address. In as 
much as Swaziland competition regime is still young, it is widely accepted that fair 
competition in markets is crucial for economic and social development, and for 
alleviating poverty.16 
On the other hand, anti-competitive practices and policies are common, and 
their adverse effects include diminishing the opportunities for innovation and growth, 
and making consumers worse off.17 In that note, Swaziland as a developing country 
need to identity and address anti-competitive arrangements and practices in both the 
private and public spheres. The best way in which Swaziland can achieve this goal is 
by addressing issues that may impair the independence and effectiveness of the 
Swazi Commission. It is the objective of this research to highlight and analyse those 
challenges. The section below list and briefly explains the challenges which this 
dissertation seeks to address. 
  
1.3 The Independence of the Swazi Commission  
 
The Act stipulates that, ‘the Commission shall be independent from control of 
any person, including but not limited to any statutory body, government or any other 
entity in the discharge of its functions’.18  However, the composition of the 
Commission indicates the opposite; it cannot be entirely independent considering 
that a significant number of the representatives of the Commission are government 
officials appointed by the Minister.19 These representatives are nominated by their 
institutions or various ministries20 and then appointed by the Minister.21The Minister 




18 Section 7 of the Swazi Competition Act. 
19 Section 8 (1) (a-i) of the Swazi Competition Act. 
20 Note that section 8 (1) provide for the list of Members of the Commission and these Members 
should come from various institutions and government ministries, viz; Ministry responsible for 
Enterprise, Finance,  Economic Planning and Development, Swaziland Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, Economics Association of Swaziland, Swaziland Consumers Association, Swaziland 
Institute of Accountants and Law Society of Swaziland. 
21 Section 8 (2). 
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is also vested with the powers to appoint any other member by virtue of that person’s 
knowledge of or experience in economics, industry, law, consumer affairs or the 
conduct of public affairs.22 
The structure of the Swaziland competition framework entails that a single 
agency, the Competition Commission undertakes the investigative,23 enforcement,24 
and adjudicative functions on all matters arising from the Competition Act25 and has 
the power to make decisions and provide remedies.26 This is the essence of the 
Integrated Agency Model.27 The Secretariat is the investigative arm of the 
Commission28 and the Board adjudicates, this is the same entity (the Commission). 
We shall see later from the decision of the Supreme Court of Swaziland in which it 
interpreted section 40 of the Swazi Competition Act and subsequently declared that, 
decisions and orders of the Commission are only appealable to the High Court and 
no further remedy shall be available to an aggrieved party thereafter.29 
This form of an institution which is constituted by government officials was 
however,  frowned upon by the World Bank in its report on building institutions for 
markets,30 pointing among other reasons that it has the potential of undermining the 
independence of a Competition authority. The World Bank suggested in its report 
that the head of the competition authority should be appointed by a committee or 
parliament rather than by the President, Prime Minister or Minister, and that the 
competition authority should function independently from a government ministry and 
have its own budget.31 It further noted that the independence of competition 
authorities may be more important in developing countries than it is for industrialised 
countries, where transparency and the checks and balances that are put in place tends 
to protect the independence of the authority.32 Trebilcock and Iacobucci correctly 
articulated this point and had the following to say; 
                                                          
22 Section 8 (1) (i). 
23 Section 11 (2) (a).  
24 Section 14 (6). 
25 Section 13 (1).  
26 Section 11 (2) (b). 
27 Fox and Trebilcock op cit (n 5) 5. 
28
 Section 18 of the Swazi Competition Act. 
29
 Eagles Nest v Swaziland Competition Commission Case No: 1/2014 [SZSC] 39.    
30 The World Bank ’World Development Report: Building Institutions for Markets’ 2002, at 142. 
available at http://www.ctc-health.org.cn/file/2009083127.pdf, accessed on 24 August 2014. 
31 Ibid.  
32
 Ibid.  
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‘It is difficult to defend institutional independence without some form of 
accountability, for instance with respect to appointments, budgetary 
allocations, financial expenditure performance review and periodic mandate’.33 
 
It is such challenges that this dissertation seeks to address in so far as the 
Independence of the Swaziland Competition regime is concerned. In doing so, a 
comparative perspective with the South African Competition Commission will be 
explored and it shall be argued that the structure of the Competition Commission of 
South Africa34 is ideal for guaranteeing the independence of the Commission and 
should be followed by the Swazi Commission. This argument however, is not to 
suggest that competition agency designs should be seen as a one size fits all, but 
rather focusing on the model that can work in Swaziland while considering all the 
peripheral forces that can render the present structure of the Swazi Commission not 
independent and thus ineffective. 
 
1.4 The enforcement of the Commission`s decisions 
 
The Act provides no direct recourse to the courts except on the stage of 
appeal where the party is not satisfied with the Commission`s decision, in which case 
the matter will be referred to the Court.35 The Act provides that the Commission shall 
have power to issue orders or directives it deems necessary to secure compliance 
with the Act or its decisions, and any person aggrieved by a decision of the 
Commission made under the Act or under any regulations may, within thirty days 
after the date on which a notice of that decision is served on that person appeal to the 
High Court.36 This provision has the effect of rendering the Commission the final 
arbiter of all competition matters if the decision is not opposed or challenged by any 
of the parties involved on any ground that would necessarily give rise to an appeal. 
It is therefore argued in this paper that this kind of competition regulation 
significantly deters the degree of responsiveness. This approach as adopted by the 
Commission, it will be argued that it is in conflict with the rule of natural justice and 
procedural fairness as it makes the Commission a judge in its own cause. The 
                                                          
33
 MJ Trebilcock and EM Iacobucci ‘Designing Competition Law Institutions: Values, Structures and 
Mandate’ (2010) 41 Loyola University Chicago L J at 457, available at 
http://www.lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol41/iss3/5, accessed on 27 August 2014. 
34 Section 20 (1), (2) and (3) of the South African Competition Act No 89 of 1998. 




opportunity to be heard by an impartial decision -maker forms the foundation for this 
rule.37 This rule applies whenever the rights, legitimate expectation or property of the 
particular individual will be affected by the decision.  
This paper will advocate for the South African approach in which the 
function of the Commission is mainly to investigate and refer matters to the 
Competition Tribunal for adjudication in which the Commission can also appear as a 
party,38 not as a final arbiter of all the matters as in the case of the Swazi 
Commission. As to the enforcement of the decisions, the Competition Act of South 
Africa (SA Act) restrictively makes that the duty of the Competition Tribunal and not 
the Commission itself.39 
1.5 The extent of the Swazi Commission’s decision making powers 
and its challenges to the regulation of competition in the 
country 
  
In terms of the provisions of the Swazi Competition Act, the Commission has 
wide jurisdictional powers to carry out investigations either on its own initiative or at 
the request of any person to determine if an undertaking is engaged on any anti – 
competitive trade practices.40 Depending on the findings, the Commission has the 
sole jurisdiction either to adjudicate or abandon the matter thus making a final 
determination of the matter, irrespective of whether that complaint was on its own 
instance or at the request of a complainant. 
This approach has the greatest potential of giving rise to a conflict of interest 
when considering the composition of the Commission. It has the potential of over 
enforcement as well as under enforcement of competition in that, the Commission 
can be motivated by varying considerations and reasons to pursue other matters with 
less interest on some matters. Where the Commission for any reason is less interest 
in pursuing a particular case that can mean an end to it even where there is a genuine 
case of a violation.  
                                                          
37
 G Fick Natural Justice; Principles and Practical Application 2ed (1979) 26. 
38 Section 21 (1) (g) of the SA Act. 
39 Section 27 (c) of the SA Act, this provision is in line with the provisions in the long tittle of the SA 
Act. 
40
 Section 11 (2) (a) of the Swazi Competition Act. 
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This is contrary to the South African situation where a complainant can refer 
a matter direct to the Tribunal in the event the Commission refuses to refer or deal 
with it.41 With such a large number of government affiliated enterprises in Swaziland 
and the significant number of government representatives in the Commission 
(threatening its independence), a conclusion that the Commission may be slow on 
taking complaints where these enterprises are involved is not too far-fetched. The 
structure of the Swazi Commission therefore has the potential of rendering the 
Commission ineffective in building free and transparent markets in the country 
hence, the investigation into the jurisdiction of the Commission is to expose these 
inefficiencies. 
Complicating this problem further is the manner in which the Supreme Court 
in the Eagles Nest case42 interpreted section 40 of the Act as ousting its (Supreme 
Court) jurisdiction and limiting the High Court jurisdiction only to appeals. This 
means that a complainant cannot bring a complaint to the High Court as a court of 
first instance where the Commission refuses to consider that matter hence, the 
overarching implications of this set up is ineffective competition enforcement. 
This paper therefore will propose that the extend of the Swazi Commission’s 
jurisdiction should be as far as to allow it to investigate and evaluate alleged 
contravention of the Act, and if so necessary, refer the matter to an independent 
tribunal or court for adjudication. It will further propose an amendment to the Act to 
include provisions which will allow a complainant to bring a case to the High Court 
where the Commission has declined to take up or refer the matter as is the case in 




                                                          
41
 See in this respect the case of Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd v Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd 
(70/CAC) [2009] ZACAC, where the Commission issued a notice of non – referral of the complaint and 
the complainant (Harmony Gold) relying on section 51 (1) of the SA Act, referred the matter to the 
Competition Tribunal. Available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACAC/2009/1.html accessed on 
21 September 2014. 
42
 See (n 28 above).  
43 See (n 40 above). 
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1.6 The comparative methodology 
  
This study will make extensive use of the comparative method in order to achieve 
the following: 
i. Assess the competition framework of Swaziland against established 
principles for ensuring an independent and effective competition regime, 
as found in the vast literature on the design of competition law institutions 
in developing countries. 
ii. Examine legislative trend and principles from jurisdictions (but mainly 
South Africa) that favours the bifurcated agency model with the aim of 
recommending the incorporation of those principles into the Swaziland 
framework. 
The selection of South Africa for purposes of the comparative analysis is based 
on two factors, viz, similarity of legal systems44 and economic relations45. As a result 
of the similarities of the legal systems of these two countries, it is no surprise that 
statutory enactments in Swaziland are to a very large extent a resemblance of the 
South African ones. Equally to that, Swaziland’s major trading partner is South 
Africa. It is reported that about 90 per cent of imports into Swaziland are from South 
Africa and about 70 per cent of Swaziland’s exports go into South Africa.46 These 
scenarios make the need for convergence of competition enforcement between the 




                                                          
44
 P Wood Principles of International Insolvency 2ed (2007) 18. The South African legal system is the 
same as that found in Swaziland, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Zimbabwe, These countries have 
in their jurisdictions the mixed legal system known as the Roman Dutch Common law. 
45
These two countries are both members of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) and a 
number of bilateral trade agreements established under the auspices of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). 
46
 T Langa (CEO of the Competition Commission of Swaziland) ‘Competition Law and Policy in 
Swaziland’: An address  to the Small States Network on Economic Development in collaboration with 
the Competition Commission of Namibia, 26 July 2010, available at 
http://www.ssned.org/file.aspx?f=405, Accessed on 16 August 1014. 
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1.7 Outline of the Dissertation 
  
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter one is the introductory 
chapter setting out the research questions, justification and methodology for the 
research. It also sets out the scope of this work. 
In chapter two, a study of the legal framework for competition in Swaziland 
will be carried out to determine if the independence and effectiveness of the structure 
on its entirety can be defended. An in depth discussion of the relevance of the due 
process norms in the composition of the Swazi Commission will be articulated in this 
chapter. 
Chapter three seeks to investigate the role of the courts in the national 
competition regulation framework, and the extent to which courts can interfere with 
the decisions and powers of the Commission. This chapter will focus mainly on the 
decision of the Supreme Court in the case between Eagles Nest and the Swazi 
Commission in which the court sought to limit the court’s power in the determination 
of competition matter in the country. A critical analyses of the cases already dealt 
with by the Commission will be carried out in order to justify any finding. 
Chapter four will provide a comparative perspective of the framework and 
competition practices between Swaziland and South Africa, with the main focus of 
the comparison being on the model for institutional design. This chapter will further 
serve as a reference for the proposal for redesigning the competition agency and 
amendment of the Act. 
Chapter five will reflect the conclusion of the research most importantly 
lessons that can be learned from the comparative discourse and incorporated into the 
Swaziland framework, the limitations of the competition framework of Swaziland 
and the possible approaches that may be implored to address those limitations. This 
chapter will also provide recommendations on areas that require reform. 
1.8  Conclusion 
 
The aerial view of this dissertation has been laid out in this chapter 
illustrating the importance and the need for a proper design of a competition law 
13 
 
institution, especially in developing countries like Swaziland, and the challenges that 
can arise if institutions are not properly constituted. It has put into perspective the 
challenges that the competition framework of Swaziland suffers from and further 
highlighted the ideal model to be followed most importantly by developing countries, 
and Swaziland in this instance being one of those.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE STRUCTURE, COMPOSITION AND 
INDEPENDENCE OF THE SWAZILAND COMPETITION 
COMMISSION 
 
2. Introduction   
 
It has already been highlighted in the introductory chapter that Swaziland has 
until recently not been enforcing competition law in the strict sense. The coming into 
force of the Competition Act in 2007 saw a renewed focus for competition regulation 
in the country. Like any other new initiative, it has its own challenges. This chapter 
provides a broad overview of the framework, structure and composition of the 
Competition Commission of Swaziland (Swazi Commission). It focuses primarily on 
the question of the independence of the Swazi Commission from political 
interference in view of the way the Commission is constituted. The procedure for the 
investigation and adjudication of competition complaints will be given more scrutiny 
in this chapter in order to determine whether the Commission is likely to be effective 
in the execution of its mandate.  
  As posited by other commentators,1 the Swazi Commission have two 
overarching areas of responsibility in terms of the Act, viz, the investigation2 and 
adjudication of complaints of prohibited practices, and the control of mergers.3 The 
Commission however, has another responsibility of advocacy under the Act,4 which 
at least has limited effect on the independence of the Commission compared to the 
former. Be that as it may, advocacy remains and should be an important aspect for 
the Commission as a new authority,5 especially in creating awareness within the 
business society on how to conduct business in a competitive way and not be caught 
off guard on competition violations, thus ensuring that a competition culture is 
accordingly developed within the Swaziland economic spheres. It is argued that 
                                                          
1
 M Brassey et al Competition Law 1ed (2002) 286, postulating that generally competition authorities 
have two broad areas of responsibilities, namely, investigation of complaint of prohibited practices 
and the control of mergers. 
2
 Section 11(2) (a). 
3
 Section 11(2) (b). 
4
 Section 11(2) (d-g). 
5
 M Gal ‘ The Ecology of Antitrust Preconditions for Competition Law Enforcement in Developing 
Countries’ (2004) New York University Law and Economics working Papers. Paper 10 at 17, available 
at http://www.Isr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/10, accessed on 20 September 2014.  
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competition advocacy, ie, those activities that are conducted by the competition 
authority which are related to the promotion of a competitive environment by means 
of non- enforcement are considered to be the most important task of competition 
agencies in developing countries.6  Fingleton and Nikpay correctly argue that 
prevention of harm through compliance is better than enforcement actions after harm 
has already been done, both in terms of the costs incurred by authorities and 
efficiency. As such, the business community should have the necessary knowledge 
and understanding of competition law and its obligations to ensure compliance.7 
Advocacy can be effective in getting the local business community to appreciate that 
competition is not enmity but rivalry exhibited through legitimate and lawful means 
to the benefit not only of their businesses but the consumers and the industry at large 
through innovation and the provision of a wide range of choices and low prices.8  
Previously, competition law concerns in the country were regulated through 
the rubrics of provisions found in the Fair Trading Act of 2001.9 Apart from 
regulating a host of trade related conduct, this Act sought to deal with the prohibition 
of false or misleading representation of the price of any goods or services.10 Clearly, 
such misrepresentation can be manifested in a number of ways including collusive 
conduct like cartels that have the effect of producing rather misleading prices in a 
particular market. This Act however, was barely invoked in addressing competition 
law issues in the country. This is attributed largely to the fact that it lacked the 
substantive provisions dealing directly with competition and did not create an 
enforcement mechanism, and as such no competition violations have been dealt with 
under this Act.  
The lack of skilled competition law professionals in the country generally can 
also be cited as one of the constraints in enforcing the Fair Trading Act. To this end, 
                                                          
6
 See Gal (n 5 above) at 17. 
7
 J Fingleton and A Nikpay ‘Stimulating or Chilling Competition: International Antitrust Law and 
Policy’ March 2009 at 17, available at 
http://www.jurispub.com/cart.php?m=product_details&p=9157, accessed on 18 August 2014. 
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the International Competition Network report for capacity building and technical 
assistance for developing countries (ICN report) revealed that, in most jurisdictions 
training in competition law only start in the Commissions and not for instance, in 
universities.11 This is the case even for Swaziland in that as of present the University 
of Swaziland, the only university in the country offering legal studies up to an 
undergraduate qualification (LLB) do not have competition law courses. Evidently, 
this left the country with very little or no pools of specialists to deal with competition 
violations save for those officials already hired by the Commission who would 
otherwise be trained internally by the Commission.  
Subsequently, the coming into force of the Competition Act 8 of 2007 (Swazi 
Competition Act) saw the incorporation of some of the provisions of the Fair Trading 
Act that spoke to competition issues.12 The Act further buttresses the point that any 
conduct that is prohibited in the Fair Trading Act remains prohibited in the Swazi 
Competition Act.13 Thus observed, the Swazi Competition Act seeks to provide a 
holistic approach in its framework (in the Swaziland context) with provisions for 
regulating competition conduct and practices in the country. 
2.1 The framework for regulating and enforcing competition law 
in Swaziland 
 
The competition law framework of Swaziland is made up of the Competition 
Act, the Competition Commission’s Regulations of 2010, the Competition 
Commission and the High Court of Swaziland with original appellate jurisdiction 
(not as a specialised competition appeals court). The Competition Commission is a 
juristic person and exercises its duties and functions only in terms of the Act,14 and 
for proper execution of its duties the Commission is separated into two sections, viz, 
the Secretariat and the Board of Commissioners. 
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The Secretariat is the investigative arm of the Commission,15 and the Board 
performs the adjudicative function. It is important to note for purposes of further 
discussion in this paper, the illusory nature of this division in the sense that 
practically the Secretariat and the Board is the same entity (the Commission). The 
decisions of the Commission can only be appealed at the High Court with original 
appellate jurisdiction and not as a specialized competition appeals court,16 and the 
decision of the High Court is final in respect of any matter brought to it under the 
Act.17 This is at least according to the unfortunate decision pronounced recently by 
the Supreme Court of Swaziland where it held that, in so far as section 40 of the 
Swazi Competition Act was concerned, no review lies in any court for any matter 
brought under the Act and no appeal lies in the Supreme Court on any decision of the 
High Court made under the Act.18 
Accordingly, it follows from this brief discussion that the framework for 
enforcing competition law in Swaziland is informed by the integrated agency model. 
This model entails that the Commission within the authority undertakes 
investigations and thereafter makes the first-level adjudication.19 The decision of the 
Commission as already indicated can only be appealed at the High Court and the 
decision of the High court is final. Fox asserts that this model is not suitable for 
developing countries as it is limited by the fact that in most developing countries, 
courts have weak structures, not independent and to a large extent do not function 
efficiently.20 As such, they lack the necessary expertise to deal with the complexities 
associated with these cases. Swaziland is obviously no exception to these challenges. 
Recently, the dismissal of a High Court judge Thomas Masuku for a ruling he 
made that was later described by the Chief Justice as being insultive of the King 
raised questions about the independence of the courts in Swaziland. Subsequent to 
this, the Chief Justice issued a practice directive that prevented litigants from 
bringing matters to court where such matters directly or indirectly involve the King’s 
Office and sought to invoke the provisions of section 11(a) of the Constitution of 
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Swaziland Act 1 of 2005. This section provides that, ‘the King and iNgwenyama 
shall be immune from suits or legal process in any case in respect of anything done 
or omitted to be done by him….’ It is noted however that the legal claims in issue 
here were in respect of clear breach of contract by some of the entities in which the 
King has an interest, and the service providers had a clear legal right of recourse to 
courts.21 This was viewed by the Law Society of Swaziland as a grave violation of 
the constitutional right of free access to justice and a threat to the independence of 
the courts in Swaziland. Further, the problems of the court’s inefficiencies as 
observed by Fox above are documented in the ICN report in which Jamaica firmly 
indicated the constraints she have in implementing competition law to which she 
stated that, ‘the judiciary is not conversant with competition law’.22 
2.2  The establishment and composition of the Swaziland 
Competition Commission 
  
The Swazi Competition Act establishes a body called the Competition 
Commission,23 which is composed of nine representatives.24 Four of these are 
government officials from various government ministries, viz, Ministry for Finance, 
Economic Planning and Development ,  Enterprise25 and an additional member 
appointed by the Minister for Enterprise26 by virtue of that persons knowledge or 
experience in economics, industry, law, consumer affairs or the conduct of public 
affairs.27 The remaining five members come from various stake holders which 
include the Swaziland Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Economics Association 
of Swaziland, Swaziland Consumer Association, Swaziland Institute of Accountants 
and the Law Society of Swaziland.28 These members are nominated by their 
respective institutions and thereafter appointed by the Minister responsible for 
Enterprise.29 
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The minister of enterprise is further mandated to appoint one of the members 
as chairperson of the Commission.30  However, none of the government 
representatives shall be appointed as the chairperson or vice- chairperson.31 One can 
argue that the exclusion of the government representatives from being considered for 
the positions of chairperson and vice-chairperson was an effort to ensure and safe 
guard the independence of the Commission. It is evidently difficult to think of any 
other reason that can justify the exclusion. If such reasoning is sustainable, it can be 
argued therefore that it was foreseeable that the presence of such a significant 
number of government officials in the Commission might render it not independent 
from political interference, hence, the decision that at least they cannot be appointed 
to the positions of chairperson and vice- chair person respectively. Evidently, the fact 
that already four members of the Commission are government officials appointed by 
the minister suffices to render the Commission not independent, irrespective of 
whether they are appointed to these positions or not. This is one of the major 
challenges that the composition of the Commission poses. 
2.2.1  The Secretariat of the Commission 
 
As already mentioned earlier, the Secretariat is the investigative arm of the 
Commission. The Secretariat is composed of an executive director and other 
employees of the Commission.32 It should be noted at this point that even though the 
Act makes mention of the existence of a Secretariat that shall discharge the 
investigative function of the Commission,33 the Act does not provide the procedure 
on how the Secretariat shall be established save to say that it should be composed of 
other employees of the Commission. It does not state the qualifications that these 
individuals should possess, how they should be appointed and their terms of 
reference. Further, it does not state the procedure on how they will conduct their 
business in the course of investigation.  
The Act further provides that the Commission shall have the power to appoint 
any of its employees to be investigation officers and that they should carry out their 
                                                          
30
 Section 8 (3). 
31
 Section8 (4). 
32
 Section 18. 
33
 Section 11 (2) (a). 
20 
 
functions subject to the directions of the Commission.34 It is not clear from the Act 
whether these investigation officers appointed in terms of this section shall be 
different from those established by section 18 (the Secretariat). From this point it 
appears that the constitution of the Swazi Commission is fragmented and not clear 
from the Act itself. Supposing the Act sought under section 38 to give the 
Commission the power to appoint investigating officers other than those constituting 
the Secretariat, it is not clear as to why and under what circumstances would the 
Commission want to do that.  
The fear associated with this seemingly random exercise of the Commission’s 
powers combined with the heavy presence of government officials in the 
Commission, is that it can have the effect of creating biases and undue influence in 
that the Commission can have the lee way of choosing people who will conduct 
investigations relating to particular complaints on the conduct of specific 
undertakings, thus compromising its independence. This fear is even more real when 
considering the significant number of state owned corporations and state affiliated 
monopolies in Swaziland. The case of Swazi MTN is a classical example. This 
company enjoys a total monopoly and exclusive trading privileges in Swaziland for 
the provision of mobile telephone network services since it started its operations in 
the country.  
The monopoly accorded to Swazi MTN by the state effectively makes it the 
only mobile telephone network provider in the country to date, and as such, the 
company is exempt from the provisions of the Act in respect of other trade practices, 
ie (the monopoly practices).35 The effect of this monopolistic nature of the industry is 
that it has always kept mobile call tariffs very high in Swaziland and has deprived the 
populace the benefits of competition which no doubt could have resulted in low tariff 
prices. Fox correctly articulates this position and points out that monopolies are 
created by the powerful in a country to protect their interest or friends at the grave 
prejudice to the general public and most importantly at the particular expense of the 
poor.36  To illustrate this point further, she makes an example of a Mexican 
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telecommunication corporation (Telmex) owned by a crony of presidents and thus 
granted a monopoly price for incoming cross-border communications.37 She argues 
that this monopoly price was guaranteed at the expense of the poor Mexican migrant 
workers in the US upon whom logic detected that they will frequently need to make 
cross -border telephone calls to Mexico.38 Further, the price monopoly deprived new 
entrants to the industry the opportunity to compete with Telmex on cross-border 
incoming calls.39  To this end, she posits as follows; 
‘Not only do the poor suffer from prices that are too high, but they suffer from 
suppressed growth. The rest of the country suffered from Telmex favoured 
position. In a modern age when business need low-priced, high-quality 
telecommunications to compete in a global economy…. Any genuine effort to 
help the poor necessarily requires more healthy competition’.40 
Interestingly, this is exactly the position obtaining in Swaziland with regard to 
Swazi MTN where presently, relatives of ‘highly prominent individuals’ have been 
appointed into the MTN Board to represent the interests of an unidentified esteemed 
shareholder that owns 10 per cent share in the MTN stake.41 Subsequently, no 
amount of public out-cry has helped to address the high call tariffs imposed by Swazi 
MTN and evidently, as Fox laments above, the poor are the most affected by these 
high communications costs. The efforts made by Swaziland Post and 
Telecommunications Corporation (SPTC), a fixed line telephone service provider to 
enter into the mobile network services market was thwarted through fierce court 
battles and heavy political interference which eventually saw the Managing Director 
for SPTC being fired by the company Board. 
It is important to note however, that the short lived participation of SPTC in the 
mobile network market saw some tremendous reduction of call tariffs and increased 
innovations by Swazi MTN in the form of MTN call free zones and call bonuses, 
which quickly disappeared after SPTC was removed from the market. There is no 
doubt that Swazi MTN was induced to introduce these innovations because of the 
participation of SPTC in the market as a competitor. This is evidently the essence of 
competition and the benefits that rivalry can bring. It is correct that competition has 
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the benefit of stimulating innovation as competitors continuously strive to produce 
better products for the consumers at low prices.42  
The question that arises regarding these random appointments of investigators 
as seen above therefore, is whether these state proclaimed monopolies can be 
successfully investigated for anti-competitive conduct not necessarily proscribed by 
an Act of Parliament as stated by section 3 of the Swazi Competition Act. It is argued 
that, such considerations have the great potential of rendering the Commission 
ineffective and not independent in the discharge of its mandate. As the Commission 
stands, it does not appear that it has the necessary autonomy to deal for instance, with 
any competition matters arising from these entities without any interference. 
The manner in which the Commission discharge its investigative function is 
such that, the Secretariat initiate investigations upon receiving a complaint or on its 
own initiative. 43 Upon the finalization of the investigation a report of the findings 
with recommendations is submitted to the Board stating the nature of the violation. If 
any violations of the Act have been uncovered the affected undertaking will be 
notified of the findings and will be invited to state its case before the Board. The 
decision –making procedure is however not spelt out clearly from the Act, save to 
state only that the Secretariat is the investigative arm of the Commission. The Swazi 
Competition Act does not state precisely as to how the adjudicative process shall be 
conducted, contrary to the competition framework of South Africa which clearly lays 
down the procedure to be adopted by the three institutions entrusted with 
implementing the Competition Act. The Swazi Competition Act only vaguely 
provides that the Commission can make its own rules of procedure.44 
A careful perusing of the Swazi Competition Act reveals that some of its 
provisions establish criminal sanctions for anti-competitive practices. Section 42 of 
the Act states as follows; 
‘Any person who contravenes or fails to comply with any provision of this Act, 
or any directive or order lawfully given, or any requirement lawfully imposed 
under the Act for which no penalty is provided…, commits an offence and shall 
on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding E250, 000-00 or to imprisonment 
not exceeding five years or to both.’ 
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  It is not clear from the Act as to how will the Commission go about in 
enforcing these criminal sanctions. If one takes into consideration that the High 
Court only has appellate jurisdiction under the Act, this would mean that the 
Commission can impose fines and imprisonment sanctions as provided by section 
35(1) (b) and 42 and thereafter have the decision appealed at the High Court. It 
would appear from this proposition that the Secretariat will double up as the 
prosecution before the Board in cases that will necessarily attract criminal sanctions 
as provided by these two provisions of the Act.45 Whether the Secretariat has the 
required expertise and skills to discharge prosecutorial function that would 
eventually see the Board finding an accused person guilty of an offence that warrants 
imprisonment sanctions, is another issue that seems to have not been given proper 
consideration in the Act.  
Another critical issue is the question of whether the power to impose criminal 
sanctions in the form of confinement can be bestowed an administrative body like the 
Commission. The Supreme Court does not appear to have given proper consideration 
of these issues when it interpreted section 40 of the Act as excluding the original 
jurisdiction of the High Court in the Eagles Nest decision.  In light of this 
observation, it remains unclear as to how the Secretariat will go about in executing 
its prosecutorial duties under the Competition framework of Swaziland.  
  The members of the Secretariat represent a broad range of professional 
specialists which includes economists, accountants and lawyers (without any 
competition law background other than training received from the Commission). It 
has been noted however, that the Act is silent about the qualifications that are 
required from the officers that constitute the Secretariat. The effect of this is that if 
the Commission appoints employees who lack the necessary expertise and 
qualification to conduct these obviously complicated and scientific investigations, 
this could have the effect of rendering the Commission ineffective. Fox and Gal 
comment on this point and state that for an authority to be effective, both the 
decision-makers and investigators must possess the necessary skills and technical 
competence to analyse and apply the legal rules as necessitated by each case.46  As 
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such it is important for the Commission to appoint appropriately skilled and 
competent staff to ensure its effectiveness. 
It has been suggested by the ICN in its capacity building report that 
secondment from experienced authorities is one expedient way of ensuring efficiency 
in newly established agencies.47 This is one aspect that the Commission might want 
to consider if it were to be effective and coherent in the discharge of its functions 
under the Act, as such the need for skilled and competent staff cannot be under 
estimated. Professionalism has the effect of safeguarding officials generally from 
interference and undue influence that would otherwise characterise institutions that 
lack professional and skilled staff. To this end, it is reported that the United States 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice Antitrust Division 
being the best established antitrust agencies in the world,48 the FTC as of 2010 had 
more than 70 Ph.D. economists employed by the agency in the Bureau of 
Economist.49 This is one other important aspect that the Swazi Commission might 
want to consider in order to bolster its effectiveness. It is well acknowledged though 
that the lack professional staff is not a problem unique to Swaziland, as the ICN 
report demonstrated that this is a challenge faced by most competition authorities in 
developing countries.50   
2.2.2  The Board of Commissioners – ‘The Commission’ 
 
It is in order to illuminate the point that unlike the specific establishment of 
the Secretariat (the investigative arm of the Commission) in the Act,51 there is no 
similar provision in respect of the establishment of the Board of Commissioners as 
the adjudicative body of the Commission. This exposition indeed supports the earlier 
observation that the division of the Commission is just an illusory one. It is evident 
though from the case of Pick’n pay v The Gables that the Board is the adjudicative 
body of the Commission.52 In this case the Commission’s Board of Commissioners 
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decided that an exclusivity clause in a lease agreement between the parties that 
sought to exclude other supermarkets from competing with Pick’n Pay in the Gables 
shopping mall violated section 30 (1) of the Swazi Competition Act. The Board 
made the ruling after the Secretariat had conducted investigations into the 
arrangements under the lease and subsequently recommending that some clauses of 
the lease violated the provisions of the Act.  
The Board of Commissioners is composed of the nine representatives of the 
Commission established under the Swazi Competition Act.53 The procedure in the 
Board is that upon receiving a report from the Secretariat, the Board will constitute 
itself for purposes of making a determination on whether a violation of the 
Competition Act has been established. In doing so, it has the power to determine 
whether to hear oral evidence or not.  In terms of the Competition Commission’s 
Regulations Notice of 2010, once the Board has made a determination on whether or 
not to summon the parties for an oral hearing their decision is final.54 In effect this 
means that the Board can make decisions with or without hearing oral evidence from 
the alleged violating party. It is not clear as to why would the Commission want to 
make a determination of a matter without giving the concerned parties the 
opportunity to state their case. As illustrated above, the decision of the Board in 
respect of any matter arising from the Act can be appealed only at the High Court 
and the decision of the High Court is final. 
As already observed above that the Act creates both civil and criminal 
sanctions, it  remains unclear whether the Board can impose confinement sanctions 
as envisaged by section 35 (1) (b) and 42 (1) in cases where the investigation reveals 
conduct that warrants the invocation of the provisions of these sections. The decision 
in Eagle Nest however, does not support a suggestion that the High Court can have 
both original and appellate jurisdiction in the event criminal conduct has been 
dictated by the Secretariat. These are the novel issues that the Supreme Court 
overlooked in its ruling of the Eagles Nest case. It does not appear that the court had 
clearly appreciated the fact that the Act creates both criminal and civil liabilities and 
thus the absurdity that has been created by the decision. These are some of the 
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concerns that the Act does not clearly address and their effect is that the Commission 
will be seen not to be effective.  
  This position is different from the South African setting where the 
Competition Appeals Court and the Tribunal have the exclusive jurisdiction to 
determine whether any conduct is anti- competitive and as such in violation of the 
Competition Act of South Africa.55 The South African Competition Commission has 
no power to intervene in such an inquiry save to investigate and refer its findings to 
the Tribunal and subsequently to the court for a determination. Further, neither the 
Commission nor the Tribunal or the Competition Appeals Court has the power under 
the South African competition framework to impose criminal sanctions. Once again, 
this scenario confirms the need for the separation of the adjudicative function from 
the Commission and having it placed either to the courts that have both civil and 
criminal jurisdiction. Alternatively, the Swazi Competition Act should clearly state 
the procedure to be adopted in the event criminal violations have been detected. In 
the present set up it remains to be seen how the Commission will deal with these 
issues when they eventually arise.  
For the reasons noted above, it is correctly observed by some commentators, 
themselves being advisors of the FTC Commissioner, referring to the FTC decision- 
making process that, ‘to outsiders, the decision- making process at the Commission 
may seem like a black box’.56 It is evident from the foregoing that this statement 
accurately describes the decision -making process of the Swazi Commission, it is 
truly a ‘black box’.  
2.2.3 The implementation of competition law in Swaziland; is it an 
internal consideration? 
 
In view of the foregoing, it is argued that the competition framework of 
Swaziland does not appear to be motivated or driven by clear internal goals57 that 
would otherwise inform the correct design of an institution that can effectively 
address competition issues arising specifically in that country. It is not clear for 
example, the goal that Swaziland wanted to achieve by putting this legislation in 
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place if other would be anti- competitive trade practices by entities, in particular the 
state owned corporations to whom the exemption does to a large extent applies, 
remained exempt from the operation of the Act.58  
The Act could have been an effective tool to dismantle, for instance, the 
monopoly enjoyed by Swazi MTN had it not been the fact that such trading 
privileges are deliberately excluded from the realms of the Act. It is perhaps 
correctly remarked that the State is in most of the times responsible for the distortion 
and restriction of competition, through legislative measures and regulations as seen 
in the Swazi Competition Act.59 Thus, Fox correctly points out that legislation should 
respond to the challenges arising in a particular jurisdiction.60  
This move does not demonstrate a vested interest on the part of the state to 
effectively deal with competition issues in the country. As a large amount of the 
formal business in Swaziland is vested on the entities that are partly exempted (state 
owned corporations) and the government proclaimed monopolies, which is a 
common characteristic for developing countries in the words of Fox and Gal,61 there 
is a need therefore for bringing these entities wholly into the domain of the Act. 
Political will and support remains the most important aspect for the Commission to 
be effective in its mandate in this regard. Similarly, the competition advocacy 
mandate of the Commission can be useful here in making the government be aware 
and even recommend the removal of these restrictive regulations.62 If the Swaziland 
Government has no political drive to deal with the problems arising from these 
entities for the benefit of consumers, practically speaking then, there is no effective 
competition enforcement in Swaziland. Competition law should directly deal with 
state - owned enterprises that impede on competition (as seen above) and state 
officials that facilitate illegal cartels or bid rigging rings,63 as we shall see 
immediately here-under the position in Swaziland in connection to this statement. 
  It is perhaps correctly argued by some writers that the sudden surge of 
competition authorities in developing countries is far from being the result of internal 
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considerations when viewed against the emergence and development of same in 
developed countries.64 On this point, Zimmer postulates that the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund’s (Bretton Woods Institutions) statement that 
developing countries have to privatize state owned entities, implement competition 
laws and liberalize their markets left them with no choice but to do so if they wanted 
to be considered for funding assistance by these two institutions.65  
The effect of this statement is that these institutions are the world’s most 
powerful and influential sources of financial assistance for developing countries and 
would impose any condition upon them in order to receive financial assistance and 
developing countries will be bound to oblige. This point is supported by Fox and Gal 
who posits that, developing countries have adopted competitions laws in order to 
fulfil contractual requirements for financial benefits and trade preferences and as 
such, they argue that the World Bank stressed the adoption of competition law as a 
condition for the granting of loans to developing countries.66  
Margaret Lee shares the same sentiments in her work in which she examine 
the practice of regional integration in Africa, and in particular in the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) region. She argues that the dependence 
on external financial assistance to fund regional initiatives give the funders the 
opportunity to determine and influence policies for developing countries.67 She 
proceeds to quote observations of other commentators with respect to the adoption of 
market integration by African countries which are similar to Zimmer’s and Fox with 
regards to the adoption of competition laws by developing countries and have the 
following to say; 
‘One thing which at least seems to be obvious is that, actors in the South should 
think very carefully about the fruitfulness of following the blue print of the 
European Union or other regional schemes from the North. If regional 
organization is to play a real role in the economies of the South it has to be 
embedded into the real life context of these economies.’68 
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  Another author quoted in Zimmer’s work makes similar observations 
regarding the adoption of competition laws by developing countries and has the 
following to say; 
‘The concept of economic freedom and free competition are not the result of an 
internal process in the South. They were introduced following a trajectory 
designed by the engineers of the economic freedom which are the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund.’69 
If one holds this reasoning, it can be correctly argued then that the effect of 
these actions by the Bretton Woods Institutions and the western governments 
manifested themselves in the inconsiderate adoption of competition laws by 
developing countries without any meaningful and thorough thought process on the 
goals they sought to achieve. Ultimately Swaziland may have been compelled to put 
in place a framework that have no effect but only to be seen to have complied with 
the instructions of the west (developed countries) and the dictates of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions. This therefore, can partly explain the inefficiencies and 
contradictions witnessed in the Swaziland framework as discussed above. 
Similarly, the adoption of market integration which is also argued not to be an 
original idea of developing countries in particular in the Southern African context 
largely explains the practice of the adoption of competition laws by African 
countries.70 Lee notes that despite the complete failure of market integration in 
Africa, especially in the SADC region, ‘it is implausible that African countries still 
believe that there is no alternative to market integration or, it is because market 
integration is imposed by the western governments and international financial 
institutions so as to enable them free access to the African markets.’71  Likewise, the 
west sought to ensure that by the time they expand into the African markets they will 
not be confronted with distorted markets as a result of anti- competitive practices due 
to lack of competition regulation and enforcement. Through competition laws the 
western countries are guaranteed of access to African markets that are free of anti – 
competitive practices and to this Zimmer correctly observes that; 
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‘Although it has been argued that enacting competition laws goes together with 
the liberalization process and would help developing countries protect their 
newly opened markets, this approach has always embodied a hidden objective 
of protecting competition which gives international undertakings enhanced 
access to the markets of developing countries.’72 
As already mentioned earlier, it is evident from this statement that the 
enhanced access comes with the assurance that at least the western countries will not 
be confronted with distorted markets because the competition authorities of those 
country’s markets would or should have dealt with those problems. The question that 
has been overlooked however, is whether these authorities do have the capabilities to 
deal with these competition problems in their jurisdictions. When taking into account 
the myriad challenges that developing country’s competition authorities are 
grappling with (Swaziland inclusively), the answer might be in the negative. These 
challenges includes lack of expertise and skilled staff,73 poorly resourced 
institutions,74 ineffective judicial systems that are not conversant with competition 
law to say the least.75 These are the issues that give a clear indication of whether an 
authority is or shall be effective or not. This is in line with the observation that 
numerous factors may have an impact on the capacity of an enforcement system to 
lead to correct decisions, and that the expertise of the persons involved and the 
resources available are such kind of factors.76  
  The major weakness of the implementation of competition law in developing 
countries is that countries simply took legislation off the shelf from developed 
countries that was already designed to achieve specific objectives, interests and goals 
for those countries and sought to implement it in their jurisdictions.77 This can partly 
explain the discrepancies observed in the Swaziland competition law framework this 
far, that Swaziland’s most competition problems are in the state enterprises and 
monopolies which are to some extent exempt from this Act. The question then is 
                                                          
72
 Zimmer op cit (n 57) 411. 
73
 International Competition Network:  ‘Lessons to be Learnt from Experiences of Young Competition 
Agencies’.  Report prepared by the Competition Policy Working Group, June 2006 at 27. Available at 




 ICN report op cit (n 11) 35. 
76
 W Wils ‘The Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial Function and the Adjudicative 
Function in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis’ (2004) 27 World Competition, 
Law and Economics Review 201-224 at 12. Available at http:/www.ssrn.com/abstract=1319251> 
accessed on 20 September 2014.  
77
 Zimmer op cit (n 57) 409-10. 
31 
 
what made Swaziland to adopt such a law if she did not want to deal with these 
problems and liberalize the markets, for instance? 
  Even though the Swazi Competition Act shows some convergence along the 
rules ensuring efficiency of markets and consumer protection in the country, 
practically, how is the consumer welfare protected when considering the issue of the 
monopoly enjoyed by Swazi MTN and the Swaziland Electricity Company which 
has always kept call and electricity tariffs sky rocketing? Obviously, these two 
scenarios do not ensure efficiency and consumer protection. Ottow correctly 
comments on this point by arguing that, ‘it is well- functioning markets that will 
provide the best guarantee that consumer’s interests will be properly saved’.78 
Markets can only function well if competition laws are properly drafted and 
enforced, and ensuring that the state does not impose anti-competitive regulation 
through trading privileges. Until such issues which are core to competition are dealt 
with in the Swazi Competition Act, the Commission will remain ineffective in 
enforcing competition law in the country and thus being reduced to an impotent 
institution. 
Competition law, well adopted and modelled can and should protect both 
consumers and producers from anti-competitive conduct that have the potential to 
raise prices and costs while reducing production.79 Consumers are the most affected 
from restricted competition as seen in the two examples above and worse still, the 
poor are the most affected. These sentiments were also shared by the South African 
Competition Tribunal in the Competition Commission of South Africa v Pioneer 
Foods (Pty) Ltd case,80 where Pioneer Foods was found by the Competition Tribunal 
to have engaged in a bread cartel that fixed prices and divided markets. In 
condemning the conduct of Pioneer Foods the Tribunal emphasised that, ‘the 
offences in this particular case are even more repugnant because they affected the 
poorest of the poor, for whom standard bread was a staple’.81  
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Similarly, the problems that the then Minister for Finance, Majozi Sithole 
pointed to be the cause of the corruption that saw the Swaziland Government losing  
E80 million every month,82 are all challenges that a properly adopted and effective 
competition enforcement can expose even though it cannot deal with.83 Indeed, there 
is no doubt that effective competition enforcement through advocacy in this case 
could at least have exposed these anomalies in the government procurement system. 
It is noted however, that advocacy could have been of minimal effect in this case 
because the alleged corruption and anti-competitive practices were perpetrated by the 
same government officials that could have been trained on how to detect such 
prohibited practices in the tendering processes. The Minister as he then was and now 
Governor for the Central Bank of Swaziland, in his report addressed to Senate 
identified a number of anti – competitive conduct and corruption practices in the 
government procurement system that led to government losing this huge amount of 
money every month. 
  Amongst a host of corruption practices, he mentioned clear cartel conduct 
akin to that witnessed in the case of Videx Wire Products (Pty) Ltd v The 
Competition Commission of South Africa,84 viz, collusion between suppliers and 
government officials to commit government without  issuing proper purchase 
tenders, bid rigging, where deliberate limiting of tenders by government officials 
resulted in one supplier presenting different quotations in different company letter 
heads with inflated prices much higher that the market price. It was also discovered 
that suppliers were colluding amongst themselves to allocate and limit tenders by 
deliberately withholding bids for other tenders. Government officials issued tenders 
to non- existing companies resulting in non- delivery of goods while government 
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paid for same, and colluding with suppliers to overcharge the government for the 
benefit of senior government officials.85 
One then can ask if such clear cartel conduct within the government 
procurement system, perpetrated obviously by senior government officials can be 
effectively dealt with when considering the significant number of government 
representatives in the Commission that threatens its independence. Ordinarily, 
competition authority’s ability to be effective under conditions of corrupt 
governments that lack transparency and accountability is generally limited,86 and the 
composition of the Competition Commission make the situation for Swaziland a 
more complicated one and that does not inspire any hope that the Commission can be 
effective in executing its mandate under the Act.  
Evidently, these are the issues that the Commission is expected to be dealing 
with if it ought to be effective in enforcing sound competition practices and ridding 
the country of the blatant anti - competitive behaviour engaged at the state level. The 
most important cartel conduct for developing countries is bid rigging which have the 
devastating effects of increasing prices and reducing the quality for large government 
projects as seen in the example above.87  It is such cartel conduct and corruption 
experienced at the government level that have threatened the economy in Swaziland 
recently, thus resulting in the country operating under a deficit. It therefore remains 
to be seen if the present competition framework of Swaziland will effectively deal 
with these problems.  
2.3 The competition enforcement structure under the European 
Union and the US Federal Trade Commission 
 
It is apposite at this juncture to briefly examine the competition enforcement 
structure and procedure under the European Union Commission (EU Commission) 
and the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC), in order to appreciate the 
challenges associated with the model that has been adopted by Swaziland as 
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indicated above. Just like the FTC,88 the institutional structure of the EU 
Commission’s Directorate – General for Competition resembles that of the Swazi 
Commission in that it is also founded on the integrated agency model.89 As such, 
comments have been made with regards to both the FTC and EU Commission’s 
competition enforcement procedures that they act as a police, prosecutor and judge in 
the determination of allegations of anti- competitive practices and thus in conflict 
with the due process norms.90 
2.3.1  The European Commission’s Directorate – General for 
Competition 
 
The EU Commission’s Directorate – General for Competition is entrusted 
with the responsibility of enforcing competition law within the Union. This is in 
terms of the European Community Treaty (EC Treaty).91 The Treaty through article 
81 and 82 sets out wide ranging anti - competitive practices that are prohibited within 
the common market.92 The officials of the Commission’s Directorate – General for 
Competition are responsible for the investigation of any violation of Articles 81 and 
82 of the Treaty, under the authority of the Competition Commissioner who is also a 
member of the Commission.93 The adjudication process is conducted by a hearing 
officer who also reports to the Competition Commissioner but not an official of the 
Directorate General for Competition.94 The decisions of the Commission are subject 
both to appeal and review in the Court of First Instance and finally an appeal lies in 
the European Court of Justice only on points of law.95 Notwithstanding however, the 
fact that the EU Commission is a team of technocrats in their respective fields, there 
are still concerns that this model poses threats to the rules of natural justice.96 This is 
despite the wide ranging powers conferred on the Court of First Instance and the 
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European Court of Justice respectively, to review and appeal the decisions of the 
Commission that have the potential to unfairly affect the rights and interests of 
individuals.97  
This is contrary to the situation arising in the Swaziland framework where 
presently the High Court has only appeal jurisdiction on all competition matters 
brought to it under the Act. It is therefore apparent that the courts in Swaziland have 
a very limited role to play in as far as interfering with the decisions of the 
Commission is concerned when compared to the powers conferred to the courts in 
the EU. Similarly, the EU Commission has no power to impose criminal sanctions.98 
It has been argued although that the heavy fines that the Commission can impose on 
offenders do constitute penalties of a criminal nature, but procedurally the 
Commission cannot determine criminal violations.99 Again, this is distinct from the 
Swaziland situation where criminal liabilities have been created under the Swazi 
Competition Act without a clear structure on how the criminal provisions shall be 
enforced. This uncertainty has been further fuelled by the contradictory decision of 
the Supreme Court in the Eagles Nest case in which it limited the High Court 
Jurisdiction on competition matters only to appeals.100 
2.3.2 The United States Federal Trade Commission  
 
The Federal Trade Commission is an independent regulatory Commission 
which is composed of five Commissioners and the chairperson of the Commission 
being appointed by the President.101 As already observed above that antitrust 
enforcement by the FTC follows the integrated agency model, the FTC Bureau of 
Competition and the Bureau of Economics are responsible for the investigation of 
competition violations under the statutes that the FTC enforces.102 These include the 
Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission’s Act.103 Similar to the Secretariat of 
the Swazi Commission, upon finalisation of the investigations the Bureau of 
Competition and Economics respectively present separate reports to the Commission 
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stating their findings and recommendations.104 The alleged violating parties will be 
informed of the findings and thereafter called for a hearing before a Commissioner 
who will act as an Administrative Law Judge.105 This Commissioner is also an 
employee of the Commission. The decisions of the Commission are subject to both 
appeal and review by the Federal Circuit Courts and a final appeal lies in the US 
Supreme Court.106 
It is not surprising however, that even in jurisdictions that have well- 
functioning and clearly independent and efficient court structures like the United 
States,107 objections about the implications of the integrated agency model have been 
raised even though without any success. It has been argued that it raises serious 
concerns about the due process norms,108 and rightly so.  The challenge associated 
with this approach is clearly understood in the recent decision in Federal Trade 
Commission v Inova and another.109  In casu, the FTC announced that it will oppose 
the proposed Inova Health Systems Foundation’s acquisition of Prince William 
Hospital Foundation. The FTC further announced that it has appointed one of its 
Commissioners to preside over the administrative proceedings in this matter. It was 
argued by the FTC that the decision to designate this Commissioner as the 
Administrative Law Judge was based on his expertise and experience in complex 
competition matters. The respondents unsuccessfully sought to have the 
Commissioner recusing himself on the grounds that such a constitution of the 
Administrative Tribunal violated the due process norms. In refusing to recuse 
himself the Commissioner relied on an old dictum in Federal Trade Commission v 
Tenneco, Inc.,110 where the FTC itself recognized the uniqueness of its composition 
and confirming that over 25 years the FTC denied the recusal of the then- 
Commissioner Robert Pitofsky. The Commission held that; 
‘unassailable that the combined functions of investigator and decision - maker 
in the office of the Federal Trade Commission do not give rise to a denial of due 
process…, because the commissioners are purposefully appointed to terms 
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sufficiently long enough  to allow them to accumulate expertness in industries 
as well as in the law’.111 
  There is evidently a number of similar cases that sought to challenge the 
composition of the FTC even though unsuccessful due to the absence of any 
evidence indicating actual bias, as it was observed by the court in the case of FTC v 
Cement Institute.112 This move saves to demonstrate only the frustration associated 
with this approach.113 The observation that these jurisdictions have the support of 
independent, well efficient and well- functioning courts structures with wide powers 
to safeguard their rights could not allay these fears.  
As already noted above that the Swazi Competition Act establishes both civil 
and criminal violations, this position is distinguished from the FTC in which for 
instance, the FTC as an independent administrative agency cannot initiate criminal 
proceedings.114 Accordingly, the statutes that the FTC enforces as indicated above, 
have no provisions that create criminal sanctions’.115 The essence of this proposition 
is that the FTC which is a resemblance of the Swazi Commission in its construction 
has no jurisdiction or power under both Acts to determine criminal violations or 
initiate criminal proceedings.  
Consequently, in the US it is noted that antitrust enforcement by the 
Department of Justice Antitrust Division favours the bifurcated judicial model, in 
that the Antitrust Division investigates and refer the case to the Federal District Court 
where a judge makes a determination whether there has been a violation of either the 
Sherman or Clayton Act respectively.116 Only the Federal Court has the power to 
impose criminal sanctions and the antitrust division assumes the role of prosecutor in 
the criminal proceedings.117 When considering the model adopted by the Antitrust 
Division, the inclusion of criminal sanctions in the Sherman Act makes perfect sense 
because the Division is bound to take all matters to court anyway. The same cannot 
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be said in respect of the Swazi Commission where the High Court has no jurisdiction 
to hear competition matters as a court of first instance. 
The question that arises at this point is that if developed countries like the US 
and the EU can experience these challenges and concerns for instance, how much 
more with developing countries like Swaziland that are still grappling with 
challenges of independence of the court and the lack of capacity for the Commission 
to attract officials with the necessary skills and expertise to deal with such complex 
matters. The fact that even the courts in Swaziland do not have wide powers to 
scrutinize the decisions of the Commission coupled with the court’s very limited 
exposure to competition law in general, further compounds these challenges. 
2.4   The rules of natural justice versus the structure of the Swazi 
Commission 
 
The incorporation of the integrated agency model as a foundation for 
enforcing competition law remains a hotly debated topic both by academics and 
courts in the jurisdictions that adopts this model.118 Such debates as seen above have 
arisen mostly in the US in respect of the FTC and the EU119 with regards to the 
European Commission as the body responsible for enforcing competition law 
provisions under the EC Treaty.  
The crux of these debates boarders largely on the compressing of the 
investigative and adjudicative functions in one entity as being against the rules of 
natural justice. It is argued that authorities incorporating this model are likely to 
suffer from prosecutorial bias or at least the appearance of it.120 Wils observes 
however, that despite such objections being raised in the EU context they have 
always been unsuccessful121 and the same hold true in respect of the FTC in the 
US122. As alluded to earlier in this work, even though these objections have remained 
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unsuccessful at least they save to demonstrate the level at which this model is 
considered to be at war with general principles that prohibit someone from being a 
judge in their own cause. 
 It has been argued that even an Act of Parliament made against natural 
justice principles as to make man a judge in his own cause is void in itself.123 In the 
modern jurisprudence however, such limitation of parliament powers can no longer 
be sustained.124 Jackson reiterates the point that it is still believed to be of a 
fundamental importance that judges and tribunals should be free from bias or the 
appearance of it.125 
Substantively, and in line with the concerns raised above, this discussion 
seeks to expose the challenges and frustration associated with this model as the 
justification for the reform of the Swaziland competition framework. In doing so, 
experiences from both the US and the EU will be highlighted. In view of the 
composition of the Swazi Commission which is composed of such a significant 
number of government officials, it is argued that such a composition will render it 
even more susceptible to political interference, influence and bias, hence the need for 
the adoption of the bifurcated agency model. This is important because in terms of 
the competition framework of Swaziland, this is the adjudicative body. 
It has come to light that the procedure in the Commission is such that after 
the Secretariat has investigated a matter, it then submits a report to the Board stating 
the findings and recommendations. If the Secretariat concludes in the report that a 
violation of the Act has been discovered, effectively the Board has already been 
exposed to the facts of the matter such that it is inclined to find a violation when the 
matter is finally brought before it for adjudication. This is what Wils refers to as 
confirmation bias.126 Similar observations have been raised in the EU Commission 
that once an opinion has been formed by the Commission it cannot be dislodged. 
This is because the natures of the investigation and prosecutorial function tends to, 
and correctly so, have bias in favour of finding a violation or securing a conviction 
once the matter is brought for adjudication.127 It is true that such bias is of no moment 
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where these processes are separated and independently of each other because the 
decision of a violation remains to be made by an independent body or the court 
anyway.128 
Subsequently, the EU has put in place extensive safeguards to ensure that the 
decision- making process is free from any procedural ills.129 This was done after a 
study revealed that a large number of the cases decided by the EU Commission were 
set aside and quashed by the Court of First Instance on grounds of procedural 
unfairness.130 Even though Wils down plays these findings and argues among other 
factors that this was the early stages of the newly established court,131 this saves to 
demonstrate the danger that this system can have and as such not an ideal model to 
be adopted by the Swazi Commission.  
The major concern here is not that the composition of the competition 
authorities where the integrated agency model is adopted give rise to actual 
prejudice, but rather the appearance of it in the eyes of the lay person is the 
challenge, hence, the legal expression that ‘justice should not only be done but must 
manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done’.132  Where justice is not seen to be 
done notwithstanding the actual reality that it is done as is the case with the structure 
of the Swazi Commission, public confidence and assurance in the settlement of 
disputes by the Commission will be diminished. At this point it is in order to reiterate 
the comments quoted above about the FTC adjudication system that, ‘to outsiders, 
the decision –making process at the Commission may seem like a black box’.133 
Practically speaking the decision- making process of the Swazi Commission does 
seem like a ‘black box’. 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has put into perspective the framework for implementing 
competition law in Swaziland, the composition of the Swazi Commission and the 
challenges that are associated with the present structure. The issues that make the 
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Commission fail the independence test have been highlighted. It is clear from this 
discussion that the composition of the Commission especially the number of 
government representatives raises problems concerning its independence and 
reference has been made to the challenges that are potentially bound to arise as a 
result of the present structure.  
The illusory nature in the separation of the adjudicative and investigative 
functions of the Commission and the dangers it may have on the effectiveness of the 
Commission has also been illuminated. Accordingly, all the concerns raised support 
the need for the re-construction of the Commission to ensure its independence and 
effectiveness. 
The question of whether the Swazi Competition Act came about as a result of 
internal considerations has also been canvassed, as well as the reasons that 
necessitated that inquiry. These being most importantly, the manner in which the Act 
sought to exclude from its jurisdiction some conduct of entities that raises serious 
competition law issues in the country and the inefficiencies as seen from the Act 
itself.  
Lastly, the problems raised by the adjudication system of the Commission has 
also been put into perspective especially the concern that it is in conflict with the 
general principles of natural justice as seen in the two jurisdictions that have been 
examined above. Finally, recommendations have been advanced on how some of 
these challenges can be remedied.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN THE 
NATIONAL COMPETITION REGULATORY FRAMEWORK  
 
 3.  Introduction 
 
It has transpired from the discourse above that the Competition framework of 
Swaziland enjoins the High Court of Swaziland as an actor in the enforcement of 
competition law in the country.1 This chapter analysis the role of the courts in the 
enforcement of competition law, it questions the relationship between the courts of 
Swaziland and the Competition Commission. It further investigates the court’s role, 
extent of participation and the power to interfere with the decisions of the 
Commission. 
 In doing so, a critical analysis of the case of Eagles Nest (Pty) Ltd v The 
Swaziland Competition Commission2 in which the Supreme Court of Swaziland has 
extensively dealt with the question of the jurisdiction of the courts under the Act will 
be carried out, with the aim of exposing the manner in which the Supreme Court in 
its interpretation of section 40 has limited the jurisdiction of the courts in dealing 
with competition matters in the country. Other decisions of the High Court made 
under the Act as of present will also be examined in order to ascertain if there is a 
reasonable justification for the Supreme Court to limit the jurisdiction of the courts in 
the manner it did. Further, an analysis will be made to ascertain if the limitation of 
the courts powers to intervene meaningfully in the decisions of the Commission will 
not have negative implications on the effective regulation of competition law and the 
development of competition jurisprudence in the country going forward. 
  It is foregone that if the Commission is to be effective in regulating 
competition matters in the country, its decisions must be subject to the vigorous 
scrutiny that the court structures would have provided had it not been for the 
limitation. Such scrutiny would have provided the necessary interrogation into the 
entire legal framework and all the issues arising therefrom, thus developing the 
jurisprudence of this newly introduced area of law in the country and equally making 
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the Commission more effective in executing its functions in the future. Further, such 
a limitation is bound to raise procedural problems in view of the fact observed above 
that the Act has provisions that give rise to the imposition of criminal sanctions 
including imprisonment terms and as such, it is not clear whether the Commission 
shall have the power to impose criminal sanctions in the form of confinements.  
3.1 A debate on Section 40 of the Swazi Competition Act  
 
It is common cause that section 40 of the Competition Act 8 of 2007 (Swazi 
Competition Act) spells out the procedure to be followed by any party who is 
aggrieved by the decisions of the Commission. This section also states the role of the 
court where a decision of the Commission has been brought before it and provides to 
that effect as follows; 
‘The Commission shall have the power to issue orders and directives it deems 
necessary to secure compliance with this Act or its decisions and any person 
aggrieved by the decision of the Commission made under this Act or under any 
regulations made hereunder may, within thirty days after the date on which a 
notice of that decision is served on that person, appeal to the court’. 
At this earliest point, the following questions are apposite. Whether it could be 
concluded that the language of the statute under the above quoted section sought to 
oust the original and review jurisdiction of the High Court in competition matters in 
Swaziland? Alternatively, can this section be construed as ousting the jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court from hearing appeals from the High Court in respect of matters 
arising from the Act? In trying to answer these questions one should first ascertain 
the attitude that has been adopted by the courts when interpreting provisions that 
sought to exclude or limit the jurisdiction of courts (ouster clauses).  
Secondly, it will be appropriate to demonstrate how the language of the statute 
under this section fares with other statutory legislation in the country where 
Parliament intended to specifically exclude the original jurisdiction of the High 
Court. This notional journey is necessary in order to determine if it was indeed the 
intention of the legislature to limit the jurisdiction of the courts and confer exclusive 
jurisdiction to the Commission as the Supreme Court held, and as the Commission 
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itself alleged in the case of Pick’ n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd v The Gables (Pty) Ltd3 
and the Eagles Nest case4 respectively. 
3.1.1 The universal approach adopted by courts when interpreting ouster 
clauses  
 
Superior courts of record across nations have always put a strong emphasis 
on the fundamental duty placed upon courts to jealously guard its jurisdiction, except 
where that jurisdiction is ousted or limited by clear and unambiguous words of a 
statutory provision.5 In the case of Goldsack v Shore, the court declared that ‘…the 
court’s jurisdiction must not be taken to be excluded unless there is quite clear 
language in the Act alleged to have that effect’.6 This position of the law is clearly 
enunciated in the laws of England in the following words; 
‘The right of the subject to have access to the court may be taken by or 
restricted by statute but the language of any such statute will be jealously 
watched by the courts and will not be extended beyond its least onerous 
meaning, unless clear words are used to justify such extension’.7 
What is striking in this statement is the emphasis that if a statute is interpreted 
to be limiting or ousting the jurisdiction of superior courts, it should clearly and 
plainly state to that effect.  In essence this means that the provisions of the statute 
should convey such a message clearly on the face of it and such ouster should not be 
searched from the wording of the statutory provision. Similarly, if the provision is 
reasonably capable of having two differing meanings, superior courts have always 
cautioned themselves to adopt that meaning which preserves the ordinary jurisdiction 
of the courts.8 In Big Games Parks Trust v Fikile Mbatha,9 the court observed that if 
it is apparent from the language of the statute that the legislature intended to oust or 
restrict the jurisdiction of the court, then it is imperative for the court not to extend its 
jurisdiction beyond the limit that have been set by a clear provision of a statute.10 
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 Case No: (1639/2012) 57 [SZHC], 12, Para 23-24. Available at www.swazilii.org/sz/judgment/high-
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7
 Lord Mackay (n 5 above) at 352. 
8
 Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Competition Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 at 170. 
9
 Case No: (2382/2009) [SZHC]. Available at www.swazilii.org, accessed on 02 October 2014. 
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In line with the observations made above, the court in the case of 
Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Cure & Deeley Ltd made the following 
remarks regarding the interpretation of statute provisions that seeks to exclude the 
jurisdiction of the courts; 
‘It is an important rule of interpretation of statute that a strong leaning exists 
against construing statute so as to oust or restrict the jurisdiction of the 
superior courts. It is also well known rule that a statute should not be construed 
as taking away the jurisdiction of the courts in the absence of clear and 
unambiguous language to that effect’.11 
Similarly, South African jurisprudence seems to be in line with the position 
obtaining in England regarding the restriction of the inherent jurisdiction of superior 
courts. Over a long period of time, South African courts have recognised the 
common law presumption against construing a statute in such a way as to oust the 
court’s jurisdiction.12 As such, it is now trite that the ‘jurisdiction of courts can only 
be excluded if that exclusion flows from express provisions or by necessary 
implication from the particular provisions under consideration, to the extent indicated 
expressly or by necessary implication’.13 In the case of Welkom Village Management 
Board v Leteno,14 the court had the following to say;  
‘When domestic remedies are provided by the terms of a statute, regulation…, it 
is necessary to examine the relevant provisions in order to ascertain in how far, 
if at all, the ordinary jurisdiction of the courts is thereby excluded or 
deferred’.15  
This rule seems to suggest that even if a provision of a statute would appear to 
be excluding the jurisdiction of the court, it remain a duty for the courts to establish 
with certainty the extent to which that provision sought to or limit the court’s 
jurisdiction and should not extend such a limitation more than what is intended by 
the provision itself. Accordingly, the Appellate Division in the case of De Wet v 
Deetlefs16 when reversing the decision of the court of first instance held that, ‘It is 
well recognised rule in the interpretation of statute that in order to oust the 
jurisdiction of a court of law, it must be clear that such was the intention of the 
legislature’. It is therefore clear from these principles that a statutory provision which 
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ousts the jurisdiction of superior courts in certain matters must not be interpreted 
widely, but must be given a strict construction. 
It is apt at this point to demonstrate the attitude and language of Parliament in 
Swaziland when seeking to extinguish the inherent jurisdiction of higher courts in a 
legislative enactment. In enacting laws, Parliament in Swaziland has indicated 
without any doubt the circumstances where the intention was to oust the inherent 
jurisdiction of superior courts of records in the country. The Industrial Relations Act 
1 of 2000 (IRA) is one such example of an Act with a plain and unambiguous 
provision crafted in clear language that excluded the jurisdiction of the High Court 
from determining labour related matters, and conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the 
Industrial Court and the Industrial Court of Appeal respectively.17 To this effect, the 
IRA has the following provision; 
‘The court shall, subject to section 17 and 65, have exclusive jurisdiction to 
hear, determine and grant any appropriate relief in respect of any application, 
claim or infringement of any of the provisions of this , the Employment Act, the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act, or any other legislation which extends 
jurisdiction to the court, or in respect of any matter which may arise at common 
law between an employer and employee in the course of employment or between 
an employer or employer’s association and a trade union, or staff association 
or between an employee’s association, a trade union, a staff association, a 
federation and a member thereof’.18 
Now, can it be said that section 40 of the Swazi Competition Act is such a 
provision that contain the language and meaning that was clearly intended to exclude 
the original jurisdiction of the High Court in the same way that section 8 (1) of the 
IRA did? Put differently, can it be argued that by section 40, the legislature clearly 
and plainly intended to exclude the original and review jurisdiction of the High Court 
as the Supreme Court held in the Eagles Nest case.19 It is reiterated here that the 
intention to oust the court’s jurisdiction cannot be read or searched into a provision 
of a statute, rather the statute should plainly and clearly on the face of it state to that 
effect20 and if the provision can be interpreted to have two meanings, that meaning 
which preserves the ordinary jurisdiction of the courts shall be adopted.21  
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Accordingly, it is argued that section 40 does not by any means resemble the 
provision under section 8 (1) of the IRA and clearly the legislature did not convey 
such an intention in crafting this section. There is nothing in the provision that 
indicates that the legislature clearly intended to vest the Commission with exclusive 
jurisdiction in competition matters and thus limiting the jurisdiction of the High 
Court only to appeals. A holistic reading of the Act clearly does not support this 
conclusion. The only thing that section 40 did as the High Court observed was to 
direct that all decisions of the Commission are appealable to the High Court,22 and 
that does not mean that the High Court cannot hear matters as a court of first instance 
where for example, criminal violations have been detected by the Commission. In the 
case of Swaziland Breweries v Constantine Ginindza,23 the Supreme Court 
commenting on section 8 (1) of the IRA had the following to say; 
‘The effect of the use of the word ‘exclusive’ in the section makes it plain in my 
view that the intention of the legislature in enacting section 8 (1) of the Act was 
to exclude the High Court jurisdiction in matters provided for under the Act and 
thus to confer ‘exclusive jurisdiction in such matters on the Industrial Court’.24 
There is doubt if the above statement can be reiterated by the Supreme Court in 
respect of section 40, ie, that by section 40 alone the  legislature intended to confer 
exclusive jurisdiction to the Commission. Evidently, by section 8 (1) of the IRA the 
jurisdiction of the High Court is expressed excluded and a complete adjudicative 
mechanism that specifically deals with labour issues is established in the Act through 
the provisions of section 6. On the contrary, no similar provision can be found in the 
Swazi Competition Act that would otherwise support the proposition that the 
Commission has exclusive powers to deal with competition matters in the exclusion 
of the High Court’s original and review jurisdiction. If for instance, the Swazi 
Competition Act had a provision similar to section 6 of the IRA which established a 
competition court or tribunal and a competition appeal court, then a leaning towards 
interpreting section 40 as excluding the original and review jurisdiction of the High 
Court could have been justified in the circumstances.  
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It is fitting to refer in support of this reasoning, to the decision of Botha JA in 
Paper Printing, Wood and Allied Workers` Union v Piennar 25 where the court 
indicated that ‘the existence of specialist courts points to a legislative policy which 
recognises and give effect to the desirability, in the interest of administration of 
justice, of creating such structures to the exclusion of the ordinary courts’.26 Clearly, 
without the establishment of similar structures in the Act, there is no reasonable 
justification as to why the legislature would have wanted to exclude the original and 
review jurisdiction of the High Court. It is common cause that Parliament can confer 
powers to an independent Tribunal or administrative body to exercise review 
function or grant other judicial remedies.27  
It is submitted however, that the independence and impartiality of the decision- 
making body should be beyond reproach and the decision making process should be 
conducted through public hearing and in a fair manner.28 There is doubt if the Swazi 
Commission possesses the necessary independence and impartiality to fairly execute 
these functions when taking into account the way it is constituted. Accordingly, the 
High Court in  Pick ‘n Pay v The Gables case correctly held that there is no provision 
in the Act that confers exclusive jurisdiction to the Commission with respect to all 
competition matters in the country or that extinguish the original jurisdiction of the 
High Court in relation to same.29 
In line and support of this argument, the provisions of the Constitution of 
Swaziland Act 1 of 200530 (Swazi Constitution) amplifies this position. The Swazi 
Constitution outlines the extent of the High Court jurisdiction and recognises the 
unlimited original, appellate and review jurisdiction of the court in both civil and 
criminal matters.31 Accordingly, section 151 (3) (a)  states specifically that the High 
Court has no jurisdiction in any matter in which the Industrial Court has exclusive 
jurisdiction notwithstanding the unlimited jurisdiction conferred to it by the 
Constitution. It is thus correctly held by the High Court that through the combined 
effect of section 8 (1) of the IRA section 151 (3) (a) of the Constitution, there is no 
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doubt that the legislature intended to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court32 
with regards to all labour issues arising either from the common law or any of the 
statutes mentioned in the provision. Regrettable, the same cannot be said with section 
40 of the Swazi Competition Act.  
The High Court had another occasion to deal with the issue of its jurisdiction 
under section 40 of the Act in the case of Ngwane Mill (Pty) Ltd v Swaziland 
Competition Commission.33 It is noted with regret though the contradictory positions 
taken by the High Court in determining this issue. The decisions in this case 
(Ngwane Mills) and the Eagles Nest case34 which eventually culminated in the 
decision of the Supreme Court were interestingly, made by the same judge of the 
High Court.  In the Ngwane Mills case the Court held that the applicant (Ngwane 
Mills) lacked the necessary locus standi to bring an application to the court in which 
the applicant complained about the decision taken by the Commission to 
unconditionally approve a merger.  
This was because the applicant (Ngwane Mills) was not a party to the 
Commission’s proceedings and was never approved by the Commission as an 
intervening party in terms of the Competition Commission’s Regulations Notice of 
2010.35 The court went on to state that even if the applicant was a party to the 
proceedings and sought to complain about the administrative process before the 
Commission, they ought to have brought a review of the Commission’s decision.36 
This contradicts the same court’s findings later in Eagles Nest (Pty) Ltd v Swaziland 
Competition Commission case,37 where it subsequently held that decisions of the 
Commission can only be appealed to the High Court and in terms of section 40 of the 
Act, no review lies in the High Court in respect of any matter brought under the 
Act.38 This is the decision that was later confirmed by the Supreme Court. 
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One cannot comprehend the reasons for the court having to enter different 
decisions on the same issue especially because the decisions in these two cases as 
mentioned earlier, were made by the same judge of the High Court. Subsequently, 
the High Court itself has had varying interpretations on the application of section 40 
of the Swazi Competition Act even before the unfortunate decision of the Supreme 
Court.39 This scenario may be understood to be confirming the observations made in 
the ICN report that courts in developing countries are not conversant with 
competition law as it was confirmed by Jamaica.40 It is submitted with the greatest 
respect however, that the decision of the High Court in the Pick ‘n Pay case41 that 
preserved the ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court seems to be in line with the 
spirit of the Act. 
3.1.2 The implications of the criminal provisions in the Swaziland 
Competition Act 
 
It has already been indicated in this work that some provisions of the Swazi 
Competition Act create criminal sanctions. In terms of the Act it is a criminal offence 
to effect a merger without the notification and authorisation by the Commission and 
upon conviction, the violating parties can be liable to a fine not exceeding E 
250,000-00 or imprisonment to a term not exceeding five years or to both.42 
Similarly, under section 42 (1) the Act provides that any person who fails to comply 
with any provision of the Act, any directive or lawful order given under the Act or 
any requirement lawfully imposed, is guilty of an offence and shall be liable to a fine 
not exceeding E 250,000-00 or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding five years or 
to both.43 This provision applies to all sections of the Act in which no penalty is 
provided.44 
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Two inferences can be drawn from these two provisions. Firstly, if section 40 
is correctly interpreted to be extinguishing the original jurisdiction of the High court 
as the Supreme Court did, then this mean that the Commission shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction to deal with criminal violations under the Act and impose criminal 
sanctions as it were, then have the decision appealed to the High Court. Secondly, if 
the Commission cannot initiate and adjudicate on criminal proceedings as it 
reasonably appears, then the Supreme Court erred in holding that the legislature by 
section 40 intended to exclude the original and review jurisdiction of the High Court 
in respect of all matters arising from the Swazi Competition Act. Pursuant to these 
two provisions, it cannot be correctly argued that the Commission by reason of 
section 40 alone is conferred with powers to exclusively enforce competition law in 
the country. 
It is accordingly argued therefore, that a careful and holistic reading of the 
Act does not support the view point as expounded by the High Court and 
subsequently the Supreme Court in the Eagles Nest case, that the role of the courts in 
the enforcement of competition law in the country is only limited to appeal of the 
decisions of the Commission.45 As such the provisions examined above presupposes 
that the High Court shall have the power to determine competition matters as a court 
of first instance in the event criminal violations are alleged, over and above its 
appellate jurisdiction. Even though the Commission has persistently argued that by 
section 40 the intention of the legislature was to ordain it with exclusive jurisdiction 
in all competition matters. There is no justification as to why the legislature would 
want to upset the legal order and confer powers to the Commission to determine 
criminal violations and impose criminal sanctions, if the Commission`s arguments 
are to be taken serious. 
Equally, the fact that the High Court has no review powers under the Swazi 
Competition Act is also unfortunate. Judicial review is the process by which the High 
Court exercises it supervisory jurisdiction over the decisions and functions of 
tribunals and other bodies who carry out quasi- judicial functions.46 The Commission 
can be classified as such a body that executes quasi- judicial function by virtue of its 
adjudicative powers under the Act and thus executing public law functions. 
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Therefore, the purpose of judicial review is to ensure that individuals appearing 
before the authority are not treated unfairly and that the decision- making process is 
indeed lawful.47 Similarly, if the authority derives its powers from a statute as the 
Commission does, then it is even more amenable to judicial review.48. In essence, it 
is with the exercise of these statutory powers that judicial review is concerned with.49  
If judicial review is meant to ensure that decision-makers do not abused or 
exceed their statutory powers,50 it is correctly argued therefore that the High Court51 
and subsequently the Supreme Court erred in holding that by section 40 superior 
courts has no jurisdiction to exercise their supervisory powers over the decisions and 
functions of the Commission. In R v Panel on Take –overs and Mergers, Ex parte 
Datafin p/c,52  the court held that the duties of the Panel constituted a public duty and 
as such it was exercising public law functions when enforcing the City Code on Take 
- overs and Mergers and it rules. Although its powers were not derived from a 
statute, the decisions of the Panel were nonetheless subject to judicial review. 
Assuming again that it was the intention of the legislature to exclude the review 
jurisdiction of the High Court, it is not clear why would the legislature want to create 
a lacuna in the law and render the Commission (an administrative body) not subject 
to the supervisory jurisdiction of superior courts. 
Accordingly, and in line with the decision in the Anisminic case,53 if section 
40 was such a provision that was capable of having two meaning, even though it 
does not appear to be so, then the Supreme Court should have adopted that meaning 
which preserved the ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court. Evidently, a prudent 
consideration of the implications of these two provisions favoured that approach. 
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3.2  The effects of the scope of the Swazi Commission’s decision 
making powers 
 
In terms of the Swazi Competition Act, the Commission has the power to 
initiate investigations into any violation or it can do so at the request of any person.54 
The Commission also have wide powers to adjourn an investigation at any stage 
whether the investigation was on its own initiative or at the request of an independent 
complainant.55 Unlike section 51 (1) of the Competition Act of South Africa (SA 
Act) which allows a complainant to refer a complaint to the Tribunal where the 
Commission has issued a notice of non-referral in response to a complaint, the Swazi 
Competition Act does not have a similar provision. Effectively, this means that if a 
complaint is lodged by a complainant and the Commission is of the view that it 
cannot initiate investigations into that complaint that could mean the end of the 
matter. This is so in view of the fact that the court has no jurisdiction to determine 
competition matters as a of court first instance as seen above.  
In terms of regulation 3 (1) (e), a complainant means ‘a person who has 
submitted a complaint in respect of an alleged anti-competitive trade practice in 
terms of section 11 (2) (a) of the Act’. The problem with this arrangement is that the 
Commission can decide to abandon or not take up a case even where there is a clear 
case of a violation and the complainant will never have another avenue to turn to for 
the matter to be dealt with accordingly. When considering the considerable number 
of state owned corporations and state affiliated monopolies in Swaziland, this move 
can give rise to problems of under enforcement of competition where these entities 
are involved. As indicated above, the Commission can either deliberately or 
mistakenly fail to condemn anti- competitive practices arising from these 
corporations even if there is a clear case of a violation. When taking into account the 
conditions in the Swaziland markets, ie, that the domestic market is largely 
encumbered by state owned enterprises and state affiliated monopolies, the risk of 
failing to punish anti -competitive conduct (under enforcement) by the Commission 
is high. This is referred to as the Type II Errors, where an authority for varying 
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reasons fails to condemn conduct that is otherwise anti-competitive and consequently 
causing chilling effects to competition.56  
Thus, it is correctly observed that ‘where there is a history of state ownership 
of enterprises, protected monopolies…, the risk and potential consequences of Type 
II Errors are high’.57 The possibility for the markets to self-correct if anti-competitive 
conduct is left undetected is minimised by the existence of the competition 
unfriendly policies and regulations enforced at a state level58 as already observed in 
the case of Swaziland.59 Similarly, the heavy presence of government officials in the 
Commission further complicate this position as it can also give rise to a conflict of 
interest and biases where these entities are concerned thus trumping the whole 
purpose of putting this legislation in place. If this status quo is to be maintained, a 
high standard of transparency, independence and accountability should therefore be 
exercised by the Commission. 
It is therefore recommended under these circumstances that the original 
jurisdiction of the High Court should have been maintained so that if the 
Commission for any reason decline to deal with a matter brought by an independent 
complainant, then the complainant can have the alternative to take the matter to court 
as it happened in the South African Mittal Steel Company case. In the absence of a 
competition tribunal that would otherwise discharge the adjudicative function, it is 
imperative that the court’s powers to determine competition matters at first instance 
should be restored. Equally, the Act should be amended to include provisions that 
will allow independent complainants to refer cases of violations to court where the 
Commission has declined to deal with the matter.  
3.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided a discourse on the role of the courts in the 
regulation and enforcement of competition in Swaziland. It transpired from this 
discussion that the courts have no meaningful role to play in enforcing competition in 
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the country and the court`s reasoning that conferring courts with review jurisdiction 
to determine competition matters will cause chaos in the business community is 
unfounded. This section has also put into perspective the challenges associated with 
the limitation of the courts powers to determine competition matters. 
 It has been demonstrated how the limitation of the courts powers can have an 
effect on the effectiveness of the Commission as well as the development of 
competition law jurisprudence in the country generally. The fact that even the 
Commission itself does not have staff that is adequately trained in competition law 
further aggravates this situation. All these factors taken together will have the effect 
of rendering the Commission ineffective in the long run if not addressed. Preliminary 
recommendations to address these challenges have been put forward. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE OF 




      
The previous two chapters have extensively scrutinised the law regulating 
competition in Swaziland. As seen in chapter two, the framework for enforcing 
competition in particular the composition of the Competition Commission has been 
analysed and the challenges posed by the present structure have been highlighted. 
Chapter three provided a critical evaluation of the role of the courts in the 
enforcement of competition law in the country. It transpired that the competition 
framework of Swaziland has limited the courts powers to participate meaningfully 
and effectively in the enforcement and regulation of competition in the country. 
This chapter is aimed at providing a detailed comparative analysis of the 
framework for regulating and implementing competition law in South Africa. Most 
importantly it focuses on the model for institutional design of the South African 
regulatory and enforcement framework. A direct comparison of the South African 
Competition Act 89 of 1998 (SA Act) and the Swazi Competition Act will be 
conducted in order to identify the areas that may be recommended for incorporation 
into the Swazi framework as a basis for the reform of the Swazi design and equally 
making the Swazi Commission even more effective in the execution of its functions 
as enshrined in the Act.   
This is in light of the fact that the Swazi Commission is relatively a new 
institution, as young as 2007; hence it is imperative that it models and aligns itself 
with the practices of those regimes in the region that have already tested their wings 
in flight. Thus, it is correctly posited that South African competition jurisprudence 
has already provided a compass for developing countries through its emergence as 
one of the most developed body of competition case law in the developing-
57 
 
countries.1 Accordingly, the South African framework presents the best modelling 
platform for Swaziland. 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, Swaziland and South Africa are 
major trading partners and as such there is a need for the convergence of their 
competition laws in order to establish a level of certainty in their enforcement 
practices. Such convergence can help in eliminating any contradictions and 
uncertainties regarding the application and enforcement of competition laws in the 
two jurisdictions. It can also help strengthen the trading relations that exist between 
the two countries in that corporations will know with certainty the competition laws 
prevailing in the country.  
Such congruence of competition laws and its importance has also been 
emphasised by the International Competition Network (ICN) especially in cross -
border mergers.2 The ICN has recognised the need for an international institutional 
arrangement that can be adopted in order to bring coherence in the enforcement of 
cross-border mergers, thus reducing conflicts on the enforcement procedures 
between states.3 The African agenda for regional integration and the 
internationalisation of world markets also calls for the convergence of competition 
laws if internal markets are to reap the expected benefits.4 Countries should thrive to 
adopt similar competition law principles, and enforcement measures that have the 
effect of restricting or distorting competition must be applied in the same manner 
between member states in order to achieve a harmonised system of competition 
regulation.5  
Similarly, both countries’ legal systems are informed by the Roman-Dutch 
Common law system. As a result of this similarity it is not surprising that the 
statutory enactment in Swaziland, to a very large extent, resembles the South African 
one. As such, the convergence on this area of the law cannot be viewed as a 
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misnomer of the prevailing practice in the country in as far as legislative drafting is 
concerned. 
To this end, it is correctly observed that there is no international law for 
competition; however, the convergence of the institutional design models and 
principles is fundamentally important in avoiding any uncertainty and ensure less 
confusing playing fields for cross border businesses.6 Evidently, this can prevent 
conflicts as each jurisdiction will be familiar and understand the enforcement 
procedures obtaining in the other jurisdiction. 
 4.1 The institutional design for regulating competition law in 
South Africa 
  
It transpired from earlier discussions in this work that South Africa adopted 
the bifurcated agency/tribunal as the model for institutional design.7 This model 
entails that the competition authority, in the South African context, the Competition 
Commission investigates all violations of the Competition Act and thereafter refers 
the case to a specialised tribunal, the Competition Tribunal for adjudication.8 An 
appeal from the decisions of the Tribunal lies in the Competition Appeal Court 
(CAC) which is also a specialised court established in term of the SA Act.9 It is 
therefore evident that the framework for implementing competition law in South 
Africa is constituted by a significant number of structures all designed in a way that 
enables them to independently exercise their duties and functions. Thus, the South 
African enforcement structure is made up of the Competition Act 89 of 1998, and 
three institutions, viz, the Competition Commission, the Competition Tribunal and 
the Competition Appeal Court. These are the three institutions for competition 
regulation as provided by the SA Act.10 
  Before the coming into force of the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment 
Act of 2012 (Amendment Act), the Supreme Court of Appeal with its original 
appellate jurisdiction (not as a specialised supreme court) was also a player in the 
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 Section 36 (1). 
10
 Fox and Trebilcock op cit (n 7) 270. 
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regulatory framework such that an appeal from the decision of the CAC lied in the 
Supreme Court of Appeal and finally the Constitutional Court.11  However, in terms 
of section 4 of the Amendment Act, the Supreme Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction 
to hear appeals in respect of a competition matter anymore. This in effect means that 
the CAC is now the final arbiter in all competition matters. There has been a concern 
that the South African enforcement structure had too many levels of appeal which in 
turn was detrimental to the proper regulation of competition in the country. This was 
mainly because of the delays involved while the matter was being taken through all 
the stages of appeal.12 One can therefore submit that the amendment of the 
Constitution to exclude the Supreme Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction in competition 
matters is intended at addressing these challenges. 
Section 5 of the Amendment Act further states that the High Court of South 
Africa or any other court of a status similar to that of the High Court of South Africa 
may decide any constitutional matter except a matter that the Constitutional Court 
has agreed to hear directly in terms of section 167 (6) (a). Effectively, this means that 
the CAC, being a court with a status similar to that of the High Court of South 
Africa, now have the jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of any matter 
brought to it in terms of the SA Act without necessarily referring the matter to the 
Constitutional Court for the determination of the constitutional question. Previously, 
the Constitutional Court had the sole jurisdiction to determine competition matters 
that raised constitutional questions as seen from the case of Competition Commission 
of South Africa v Senwes Limited.13 
 It was observed by the South African democratic government that the South 
African economy in the apartheid era was largely directed and protected by the 
government, as such markets were highly concentrated and the black majority was 
largely excluded from participating in the economic activities of the country.14 This 
was mainly caused by the fact that most of the large corporations were family owned 
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 Section 62 (4). 
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 Fox and Trebilcock op cit (n 7) 5. 
13
 Case CCT 61/11 [2012] ZACC 6. 
14
 Fox and Trebilcock (n 7 above) 267. See also the Preamble to the Competition Act of South Africa 
which records among other issues that the apartheid and other discriminatory laws and practices of 
the past resulted in excessive  concentrations of ownership and control within the national 
economy… and unjust restriction of full and free participation in the economy by all South Africans. 
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and operated on a culture of cronyism that lacked accountability and transparency.15 
In view thereof, it is apparent that the need for proper and effective competition 
regulation post –apartheid was crucial in order to allow the South African market 
structures to function properly and efficiently, and the only way to achieve that goal 
was to enforce a robust competition culture.  
Similarly, the public interest consideration in mergers in the South African 
framework serves partly to safeguard and ensure that the previously disadvantaged 
are afforded an opportunity to effectively and meaningfully participate in the national 
economy of South Africa.16 It is aimed at ensuring amongst other issues that post – 
merger, small businesses controlled or owned by the previously disadvantaged 
persons remain competitive and that the proposed merger will not have negative 
effects on employment.17 The essence of the public interest doctrine was tested for 
the first time in South Africa in the case of Minister of Economic Development and 
Others v Walmart Stores Inc and Another.18 The CAC held in this case that the 
merger between Walmart and Massmart could not be justified on substantial public 
interest grounds mainly for two reasons. Firstly, it was observed by the court that the 
merger was the cause of the retrenchment of about 503 workers and as such the 
merged entity was to reinstate all the workers that were retrenched during the period 
preceding the merger and that no further retrenchments should be effected for a 
period of two years after the merger. 
Further, the CAC ordered that the merged entity should commission a study 
to determine the most suitable way in which local South African suppliers in 
particular small and medium size suppliers can be empowered such that they can 
effectively conduct business with the merged entities thus benefitting from the 
national economy as well. Eventually, the merger was approved with the conditions 
that the two issues mentioned above were addressed by the merged entity. In view of 
the foregoing, it is clear therefore that the South African apartheid history largely 
contributed to the enormous checks and balances previously put in place under the 
South African framework as seen above. 
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 J Schulschenk, Corporate Governance Report Programme: Interview Summary Report, August 
2012 at 1. Available at www.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/2013_alcrl_pdf. Accessed on 10 November 2014. 
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4.1.1 The Competition Commission of South Africa 
 
Under the South African framework, the SA Act establishes a body called the 
Competition Commission (SA Commission), which is a juristic person and exercises 
its powers only in terms of the SA Act.19 The SA Commission is the investigative 
authority.20 It is entrusted with the duty to enforce the provisions of the SA Act and 
as such it investigates competition practices that are in conflict with the Act. The SA 
Commission can initiate investigations on its own or at the request of a 
complainant.21  The Tribunal can also refer any matter to the Commission for 
investigation.22 The Commission have one year to investigate all complaints referred 
to it and where a prohibited practice has been established, refer the matter to the 
Competition Tribunal for adjudication.23 This period can be extended upon 
agreement between the Commission and the complainant in the case the matter was 
reported by a complainant,24 alternatively, the Commission can apply to the Tribunal 
for an extension.25  
The only instance where the Commission is exempt from the statutory time 
limit is when the complaint has been initiated by the Commission itself.26 In 
Competition Commission v Clover Industries Ltd,27 the Competition Tribunal held 
that a complaint initiated by the Commission is not subject to the time limits as 
provided for by the Act. If the Commission decides not to refer the case to the 
Tribunal then a notice of non -referral must be served to the complainant, in which 
case the complainant has the right to refer the matter directly to the Competition 
Tribunal.28  
Similarly, if the Commission fails to refer the matter within the specified time 
period and does not request for an extension either from the complainant or the 
Tribunal it is taken that the Commission has issued a notice of non- referral and that 
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 Section 19 (1). 
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 Section 21 (c). 
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 Section 21 (1) (i). 
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have the effect of bringing the matter to finality in the case where the matter was 
initiated by the Commission. Where upon investigation a prohibited conduct is 
established, the Commission refers the matter to the Tribunal for adjudication and the 
Commission can appear before the Tribunal as a party.29  
It is noted that unlike the Swaziland framework, the South African structure 
provides a clear position on the manner in which the SA Commission should conduct 
itself in the execution of its investigative function in terms of the time frames. Under 
the Swaziland Competition Commission Regulations Notice of 2010, the 
Commission has ninety days to make a determination in respect of any alleged 
prohibited conduct which it either initiated or received as a complaint from a third 
party.30 The Swazi Commission can upon notice to both the complainant and the 
undertaking that is the subject of the investigation extend the period provided for 
under sub-regulation (a) for another sixty days.31  
Contrary to the South African position in which the SA Commission is not 
bound by any lapse of time where it has initiated the complaint, the Swazi 
Commission is equally time bound in accordance with the Act even where it has 
initiated the complaint.32 However, it is not provided in the Swazi Competition Act 
as to what should happen if the Commission exceed these time limits without 
notifying the other interested parties viz, the complainant and the entity under 
investigation. This question arose in the Eagles Nest v The Competition Commission 
case.33 It was argued by the applicant that the Commission exceeded the 
investigation time period as provided for by the Swazi Competition Act. It transpired 
that the Commission exceeded the time limits as provided by the Act and neither 
notified the applicants, (respondents in the earlier proceedings) nor made an 
application to the court for such an extension. The applicant (Eagles Nest) sought an 
order declaring that the Commission was bound by the time frames as provided by 
the Swazi Competition Act and if it has to exceed that period, the Commission 
should have made an application to the court for such an extension.   
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The Supreme Court however declined to make a determination on this issue 
and as such it remains unclear as to the right course to be taken where the 
Commission has exceeded the statutory time limits without having notified the 
affected parties. Under the South Africa law, the requirement that the complainant’s 
consent must be obtained before the SA Commission can extend the investigation 
period was clearly made to protect the rights of the complainant.34  This would make 
sure that the Commission does not engage in endless investigations to the prejudice 
of the complainant. This is particularly so in instances where the complaint was 
initiated by an independent complainant and not the Commission. 
In order to protect the interest and rights of all parties that may be interested 
in the investigations of the Commission from time to time, it is submitted that the 
Swazi framework should incorporate provisions that will compel the Commission to 
make an application to the Court where there is a need for the time limit to be 
extended. Similarly, where the Swazi Commission has issued a notice not to pursue a 
complaint, the complainant must be allowed to refer the complaint directly to court. 
As of present, the Swazi Act does not provide any guidance on the position to be 
taken where the Commission has declined to pursue a particular matter. Further, the 
Swazi framework must include provisions that will mandate the Commission to refer 
all matters of criminal violation to court. This is the position in South Africa in 
respect of the provisions of the SA Act that attracts criminal sanctions.35 To this end, 
the SA Act provides that the Magistrate Court has jurisdiction to impose any penalty 
provided for under the Act.36  
It is noted though that the Magistrate Court can only impose penalties in 
respect of those criminal offences that impede on the administration and enforcement 
of the Competition Act37 and not administrative penalties which can only be imposed 
by the Tribunal and the Competition Appeal Court for a contravention of the 
substantive provisions of the Act.38 In the case of Federal Mogul Aftermarket 
Southern Africa (Pyt) Ltd v The Competition Commission,39the CAC made a 
distinction between those provisions of the SA Act which attracts criminal sanctions 
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 Neuhoff et al (n 21 above) 244. 
35
 Section 75. 
36
 Section 75. 
37
 Section 70. 
38
 Neuhoff et al op cit (n 21 above) 294. 
39
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and those which are followed by administrative penalties and accordingly held that, 
the proceedings of the Tribunal which eventually lead to the imposition of the 
administrative penalty, are in their nature civil and not criminal.40 As such, they do 
not constitute criminal proceedings as to warrant the invocation of the provisions of 
section 35 of the Constitution which regulates the procedure in respect of arrested, 
detained and accused persons as alleged by the appellant. 
A criminal complaint therefore can be initiated by the Competition 
Commission which is the only body responsible for the administration and 
enforcement of the SA Act. The police are responsible for the investigation of all 
allegations of criminal violations under the Act and offenders are prosecuted by the 
National Prosecution Authority at the Magistrate Court.41 This is contrary to the 
Swaziland position where presently the Act does not give guidance on how the 
investigation and adjudication of criminal cases should be conducted, most 
importantly because the courts lack jurisdiction to hear competition cases as courts of 
first instance. 
4.1.2 The Competition Tribunal 
 
Here lies a major distinction with the South African law. Whereas the Swazi 
Commission undertakes both investigative and adjudicative function, under the 
South African framework, the Competition Tribunal (Tribunal) is the adjudicative 
body. The Tribunal is the court of first instance in all competition matters.42 It is 
therefore entrusted with the adjudication of all competition complaints brought to it 
by the Commission or individual complainants where the Commission had issued a 
notice of non- referral in terms of section 51(1) of the SA Act as seen above.  It has 
the power to determine any matter brought to it under the Act and to order 
administrative penalties.43 Thus, under the South African Competition framework, 
the adjudicative function is structurally independent from the investigation and 
enforcement function.44   
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The Tribunal also acts as an appeal body in respect of all the issues that the 
SA Commission has decision- making powers such as the approval of small and 
intermediate mergers and the granting of exemptions from the SA Act.45 As 
mentioned earlier, the Tribunal can also refer any matter to the Commission for 
investigation.46  As such, the Tribunal cannot make an order that purports to approve 
or prohibit a small or intermediate merger as a court of first instance,47 but can only 
make an order as an appellate body in respect of a decision of the Commission. 
However, with regards to large mergers the Tribunal has the sole power to make a 
determination whether to approve or prohibit a large merger subject to the 
Commission’s recommendations.48  
In the consideration of large mergers, the SA Commission upon receipt of a 
notice for a large merger must refer the notice to the Tribunal and to the Minister.49 
The SA Commission can only recommend to the Tribunal whether to authorise or 
prohibit the merger with or without conditions.50  The SA Commission thus has no 
power under the Act either to approve or prohibit large mergers. However, the 
Tribunal also has no power under the Act to make a determination in respect of a 
large merger if that merger is subject to the jurisdiction of specific provisions of the 
Banks Act 94 of 1990 and the Co- operative Banks Act of 2007.51 This is regardless 
of whether the proposed merger raises competition issues or not. 
The South African law on mergers is different from the position that obtains 
in Swaziland in that under the Swaziland framework there are not thresholds for 
mergers consideration. This in effect means that the Swazi Commission considers all 
mergers whether small, intermediate or large. This is attributed to the fact that the 
Swazi Commission is the only body responsible for enforcing competition. Similarly, 
under the SA Act it is only the Tribunal that can order administrative penalties and 
not the Commission as it is the case with the Swazi Commission. 
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 It is evidently clear from the South African Framework that the structures put 
in place are each meant to ensure the independence and effectiveness of the 
institutions entrusted with the enforcement of a vibrant competition regulation in the 
country. Thus, it is submitted that the enforcement structure for Swaziland should 
also be reconsidered to include either a competition tribunal as an adjudicative body 
or alternatively, the Commission should investigate and refer matters to court. This 
can ensure the independence of the decision- making process of the Commission. 
4.1.3 The Competition Appeal Court 
 
The SA Act establishes a specialised court known as the Competition Appeal 
Court (CAC).52 The CAC is similar to the High Court in terms of status53 but can 
hear only appeals brought to it in terms of the SA Act. The CAC is constituted by the 
Judge President and two other judges sitting together and each of whom must be a 
judge of the High Court.54 All matters brought before the CAC must be heard by 
three judges except for cases of a procedural nature. 
The CAC has appellate and review jurisdiction only and as such it can hear 
appeals from final decisions of the Tribunal and can review any decision of the 
Tribunal.55  As already mentioned above, in terms of section 4 of the Amendment 
Act, the decision of the CAC is final and the Supreme Court of Appeal has no 
jurisdiction to determine an appeal in respect of a matter brought to the CAC in terms 
of the SA Act. Similarly, the decision of the CAC is final in all matters that the CAC 
has exclusive jurisdiction.56 In terms of the SA Act, the CAC shares exclusive 
jurisdiction with the Competition Tribunal with regards to the application and 
interpretation of the provisions of chapter 2, 3 and 5 of the SA Act.57 These chapters 
contain provisions dealing with prohibited practices, merger control as well as the 
investigation and adjudication procedures respectively.58 
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The advantage of having a specialised court under the South African 
framework ensures a speedy resolution of all competition complaints that have to be 
referred to the court. It also ensures that competition matters are dealt with by judges 
that have the necessary expertise to deal with competition matters. This is contrary to 
the Swaziland position where the High Court sits as an appellate court in competition 
matters with its original jurisdiction and the judges hearing competition cases have 
no training in competition law. This is another factor that distinguishes the South 
African approach from the Swaziland one.  
It is thus submitted that the Swazi framework should be re-designed in such a 
way that the High Court should have a specialised division that will deal specifically 
with competition matters. Such a move can also ensure that the judges handling 




This chapter has provided a discussion of the enforcement structure under the 
South African framework and how it ensures the independence of each of the three 
institutions that have been established by the SA Act to regulate and enforce 
competition law in the Republic. The chapter has highlighted the major differences 
between the two frameworks and the advantages that are associated with the South 
African competition law design.  
It is clear from the structure that each of the institutions is designed in such a 
way that it can effectively exercise its functions without any interference or prejudice 
and the independence of each of the institutions cannot be questioned. It is for the 
same reasons that the model adopted by South Africa is the ideal one for Swaziland 









Having conducted an extensive research on the legal framework for 
regulating and enforcing competition law in Swaziland in the preceding chapters, this 
chapter concludes the study and will provide some recommendations that may be 
considered and adopted in order to give greater effectiveness to the entire 
competition enforcement system in particular the Competition Commission of 
Swaziland. As mentioned earlier on that until 2007 there was no implementation of 
competition law in the country in the strict sense. The coming into force of the 
Competition Act in 2007 brought a direct focus for developing and enforcing a 
vibrant competition culture in the country.  
This treatise provided an analysis on the composition of the Competition 
Commission with the aim of ascertaining whether the design of the Swaziland 
regime can render it independent and effective in enforcing competition law in the 
country. In doing so, a critical examination of the composition of the Swazi 
Commission was done.  
The extent of the court’s role and participation in competition matters 
generally was also explored and the degree at which the court’s powers to deal with 
competition matters has been limited was questioned. This treatise further 
highlighted the challenges associated with the manner in which the court’s powers 
over competition matters have been limited.  
Finally, a comparative analysis on the enforcement structures and 
institutional design in other jurisdictions was conducted. An extensive comparative 
study of the South African competition law framework was done in order to justify 
the recommendation that the Swaziland Competition Commission should follow the 
bifurcated agency model as the basis for its design. As such, the purpose of the 
comparative study was to highlight the benefits associated with the design adopted 
by South Africa in particular the separation of the three institutions entrusted with the 
duty to effectively implement competition in the country. Most importantly, it was 
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observed that such separation is vital for ensuring and safe guarding the 
independence of the institutions. 
The suggested recommendations are largely informed by the finding of the 
entire research. Most importantly, lessons that have been learned from the 
competition enforcement architecture of South Africa will form a major part of the 
aspects to be considered for the reform of the Swaziland regulatory framework. 
5.1 The structure and composition of the Swaziland Competition 
Commission 
 
It has been shown in the earlier analysis that the composition of the Swazi 
Commission militates against the independence of the Commission. It came out clear 
from this research that the manner in which the representatives of the Commission 
are appointed has a negative effect on the independence of the Commission. 
Likewise, it has been highlighted how the significant number of government officials 
in the representation of the Commission can render the Commission not independent.  
If the independence of the Swazi Commission cannot be assured, there is no doubt 
that the Commission cannot be effective in the execution of this very important 
mandate. 
 Developing countries like Swaziland do need a competition law framework 
that is competent enough to deal effectively with government imposed restrictions 
upon competition as seen in the case of Swaziland. This is one other way in which 
economic development and poverty alleviation can be guaranteed. Until such time 
that the competition framework of Swaziland is designed in a way that will seriously 
and effectively address the competition challenges that are presently obtaining in the 
country, the implementation of competition law will forever remain an exercise in 
futility. 
The illusive separation of the Swazi Commission and the challenges it poses 
to the effective enforcement of competition has also been illuminated. It has been 
noted that this kind of institutional design has been criticised in the jurisdictions 
whose competition regimes are founded on it. As indicated in this work, such 
criticisms have arisen mostly in the United States of America with regards to the 
FTC and the European Commission of the European Union. It is for the same reasons 
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it has been argued in this work that this kind of a design is not suitable for 
Swaziland.  
5.1.1 The role of national courts in enforcing competition law   
  
The study has also examined the role of national courts in the enforcement of 
competition law in the country as shown above. It transpired from this work that the 
jurisdictional powers of the courts to meaningfully intervene and contribute to the 
development of this area of the law have been curtailed. The limitation created by the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 40 of the Swazi Competition Act as 
ousting the original jurisdiction of courts has been discussed, as well as the negative 
effects that this decision has suffered the implementation of competition in the 
country. The regrettable consequences of the decision in Eagles Nest v The 
Swaziland Competition Commission have been illuminated. Evidently, the court’s 
reasoning that chaos in business dealings would result if ordinary courts were to 
determine competition matters as courts of first instance is not supported.1  
It is thus submitted that such reasoning is not in line with current trends when 
considering the enforcement of same in other jurisdictions. Evidently, it is the very 
same limitation of the court’s jurisdiction that has caused chaos and confusion in the 
enforcement of the Act as seen above.  The importance of the scrutiny that is 
provided by courts structures cannot be over emphasised and the South African 
framework is a classical example of how courts can contribute positively in 
developing good competition law principles.2  
5.1.2 The findings of the comparative study 
 
The comparative study looked primarily into the model for institutional 
design of the South African competition law framework.  The aim of the examination 
of the model adopted by South Africa was to identify and compare its strengths and 
weaknesses with the model adopted by Swaziland and finally incorporate the 
findings as a basis for the reform of the Swaziland framework. It transpired that the 
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South African Competition Act establishes three distinct institutions that are all 
designed in a way that allows them to independently exercise their functions in 
accordance with the SA Act. On the contrary, it has been demonstrated how the 
fusing of the investigative and adjudicative functions of the Commission can render 
it ineffective in the proper execution of its mandate. 
The SA Commission constitutes the investigative body under the South 
African competition framework and it is independent and separate from the 
Competition Tribunal which is an adjudicative body. Similarly, the Competition 
Tribunal is independent from the Competition Appeal Court (CAC) in that in terms 
of the SA Act, the CAC can only hear appeals from the decisions of the Competition 
Tribunal hence, the CAC is a specialised appeal court and in terms of section 4 of the 
Amendment Act, its decisions are final.  
5.2 Recommendations 
 
First and foremost, there seems to be a need to reconsider the composition of 
the Competition Commission in order to ensure the independence of the 
Commission. The manner in which the representatives of the Commission are 
appointed should also be re-visited. The number of government representatives in the 
Commission should be reduced as this is the major issue that threatens the 
independence of the Commission. The Minister should be mandated to appoint two 
representatives as is the case with the South African Commission where the minister 
can only appoint the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner respectively,3 and 
the rest of the other staff is appointed by the Commissioner and are not necessarily 
government officials. 
Similarly, the other representatives that are nominated from the other 
stakeholder institutions should be appointed by the Commissioner after being 
nominated by their respective institutions. This can minimise the amount of influence 
that may be imposed by the government upon the Commission. It has been 
demonstrated how such influence can be detrimental to the effectiveness of the 
Commission in particular where the conduct of the state owned corporations and 
government affiliated monopolies is in question. There is doubt if the Commission 
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can execute its mandate effectively and fairly under the present framework. 
Accordingly, it is recommended that the Minister responsible for Trade and Industry 
should appoint only two representatives, these being the Commissioner and the 
Deputy Commissioner. 
Secondly, it also recommended that the Swazi Competition Act should 
incorporate provisions that will clearly outline the court’s powers under the Act and 
extend the jurisdiction of the courts to include determining competition matters as 
courts of first instance. This can resolve the confusion that has been created by the 
decision of the Supreme Court where it has excluded the original jurisdiction of the 
courts in all competition matters, notwithstanding the fact that the Act establishes 
criminal sanctions which logically should be enforced by courts of law. This will 
render the Swaziland framework to be in line with international standards where for 
instance under the South African and the US frameworks, criminal competition 
violations are dealt with by courts of law as opposed to the Commission. Under the 
South African framework for instance, none of the institutions established can 
impose criminal sanctions. Alternatively, the Swazi Competition Act should be 
amended to clearly state the applicable procedure in the event criminal violations are 
established. 
Thirdly, it is also imperative that the provisions that give immunity to the 
state owned corporations and government proclaimed monopolies should be 
expunged from the Act and these entities should not be exempted in any way from 
the full operation of the Act. This will help ensure that a strict competition culture is 
developed in the country and that the legislation can effectively respond to the 
present competition challenges. If anti- competitive practices by these entities are not 
addressed by the Act, there is no doubt that this will undermine the efforts made to 
enforce and develop a positive competition culture in the country generally. 
Fourthly, the Swazi Competition Act should be amended to include 
provisions that will clearly state the procedure to be followed where the Commission 
have exceeded the stipulated time frame. Presently, the Swazi Competition Act only 
provides that the Commission can inform the entity under investigation if there is a 
need for the extension of the time limit.4 It is recommended that in the event the 
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Commission needs to extend the stipulated time limit, it has to make an application 
to court in order to avoid situations where the Commission will extend the stipulated 
time lines without notifying the other parties. The Act should also contain provisions 
that will stipulate the procedure in the event the matter is reported by an independent 
complainant. As of present the Act is silent on what should happen if the matter was 
reported by complainant and not initiated by the Commission. 
Finally, the Swazi Competition Act should include provisions that will allow 
a complainant to refer a matter directly to Court in the event the Commission has 
refused to investigate or adjudicate on the matter for any reason. This will ensure 
proper regulation and that the Commission does not overlook matters that otherwise 
raise competition challenges. 
It is thus hoped that the above mentioned recommendations can help the 
Commission in modelling the institutional design of the Swaziland framework to the 
right direction. It cannot be over emphasised that it is through a proper design of the 
competition enforcement structures that effective implementation of competition law 
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